THE MLS ACCESS ISSUE:
A RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS
William L. Trombetta*
I. INTRODUCTION
Buying a home is likely to be the most significant purchase that
the majority of consumers will ever make. Unfortunately, several
widely used practices in the real estate industry throughout much of
the country do not appear to work in the consumer's best interest.
For example, rules and regulations of various Realtor' boards and
multiple listing services (MLS) may unnecessarily hamper brokers in
attempting to serve the public and deprive consumers of the right to
contract with whomever they choose.
The MLS is a mechanism akin to a clearinghouse that brokers
use to compile and disseminate home listings and offerings to the
public.2 Although some MLS' are independent, most are controlled
by committees of local boards of Realtors. 3 In theory, an MLS can
reduce market imperfections and lower the cost of the home purchase
to the consumer by expanding the size of the market in which any
one broker or homeowner operates.
In practice, however, each MLS operates in a separate territorial
jurisdiction with its own "data bank." From an economist's perspective, such data banks of housing inventory can be considered as natural monopolies with concomitant advantages and efficiencies as long
as their monopoly characteristics are regulated. These advantages,
however, are likely to be offset by the exclusionary practices often
found in an MLS, particularly a Realtor board-controlled MLS. The
vast majority of the brokerage firms and brokers in a trade area participate in the MLS and it quickly assumes a dominant role in the
marketing of residential real estate. 4 A broker (and particularly a
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1 Approximately 925 MLS' are run by local Realtor boards while only about 200 are run
independently of Realtor boards. See Brooks, Ruling Eases Access to Multiple Listings, N.Y.
Times, July 6, 1980 at 86.
' For example, 400 Realtor agencies in Bergen County, New Jersey, recently agreed "not
to engage in racial steering or other discriminatory tactics in housing transactions with black
customers." Hanley, Realty Agencies in Bergen Settle Suit on Steering, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1,
1980, at 82. The four MLS' involved accounted for approximately 85% of the housing in the
trade area.
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newly licensed salesperson) experiences difficulty in pursuing his
occupation unless he can participate in the MLS. Unfortunately,
where the MLS is a committee of the local board of Realtors, access
to the MLS is conditioned on mandatory, and in many cases, very
associaexpensive, membership in the local Realtor board, the state
5
tion of Realtors, and the National Associations of Realtors.
The justification proffered for conditioning MLS access upon
Realtor board membership often takes the form of a concern for high
standards and professionalism of the trade group. Realtors portray
restrictions on MLS access as a necessary step in their endeavor to
strive for high standards and to assure competent, qualified, and honest practitioners. 6 While one cannot quarrel with efforts by trade
associations to upgrade their standards, it is necessary to keep in
mind that trade associations have been known to cross over the thin
line that separates reasonable efforts at upgrading the occupation
from imposing unreasonable restraints. 7 Moreover, it is not clear
that such efforts to improve standards really are necessary since virtually all states regulate the practice of real estate to some extent. 8
Under the antitrust laws, it is only unreasonable restraints of
trade which are prohibited.9 Generally, any combination or agreement which operates to restrain trade will therefore be analyzed
under the "rule of reason" standard.' 1 Nevertheless, "there are
' Trombetta, Using Antitrust Law to Control Anticompetitive Real Estate Industry Practices, 14 J. CONSUMER AFF. 142, 143 (Summer 1980).
6 For an excellent discussion of the demythification of Realtor "sub-agency" fiction, see
Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20
ARIz. L. REv. 767 (1978).
Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P. 2d 833, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 1 (1976); Falcone v. Middlesex County Medical Soc'y, 34 N.J. 582, 170 A.2d 791 (1961);
Grillo v. Board of Realtors of Plainfield Area, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. Div. 1966);
Comment, Restraint of Trade-PrivateAssociations- Exclusive Multiple Listing Service As a
Concerted Refusal to Deal and a Tortious Interference with Nonmember Brokers' Rights to
Practice His Profession, 21 RUTCERS L. RE'. 547 (1967).
' For an example of state statutes which regulate the real estate industry, see N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45:15-5 & :15-17 (West 1978 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
" In Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), Justice Brandeis outlined
the contours of the rule of reason analysis:
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may
suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention
will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
Id. at 244.
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certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm" caused or business justification for the imposition of the restraint." If it is determined that the
restraint falls within this prohibited class, the application of the per
se rule ends the antitrust inquiry in a finding of illegality.
Included among per se violations is the group boycott or concerted refusal to deal. 2 In a number of reported decisions, MLS
access restrictions have been characterized as group boycotts because
the listing members concertedly agreed to withhold information on
and access to the pool of available listings."' Yet in the context of a
trade association providing benefits to its members, application of the
per se standard to assess alleged antitrust violations has often been
deemed unwarranted so as to avoid the "conclusion that an association which provides any economic benefit to its members would be
compelled to provide that same benefit to nonmembers." " Furthermore, the indirect boycott created by the imposition of membership restrictions incidental to the carrying out of the goals of a
trade association has been recognized as distinguishable from naked
restraints designed to coerce parties to engage in anti-competitive
practices." Thus, in cases involving trade association members entering into an agreement not directly coercive or involving predatory
conduct aimed at the elimination of competition, the rule of reason
standard has often been applied rather than the door-closing per se
approach. 6
This limitation on the application of the per se rule is particularly
warranted in a situation where a trade association opens its membership, and thus access to its competitive benefits, to all those who
"voluntarily" choose to join. Recently, courts and commentators have
begun to deal with the MLS access issue in this pristine form: does
" Northern Pac. By. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,5 (1958).
" E.g., Klor's v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
1'See, e.g., Grillo v. Board of Realtors of Plainfield Area, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635
(App. Div. 1966); Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 304 A.2d 493 (1973).
'" Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 833, 839, 130
Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1976).
" See Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 932-34, 549 P.2d 833,
840-41, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1, 8-9 (1976); Austin, Real Estate Board and Multiple Listing Systems as
Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1341 (1970).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [1980] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,624 (5th Cir. 1980); Marin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d
833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976).
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the conditioning of MLS access upon Realtor board membership in
and of itself unreasonably restrain trade and, consequently, violate
the antitrust laws?

17

This article will attempt to provide an empirical approach to the
MLS access issue within a rule of reason context. A number of issues
are apparent: first, does a Realtor board's requirement of membership
as a precondition to access to a board owned and operated MLS restrain competition within the meaning of section 56:9-3 of the New
Jersey Statutes Annotated

'

or section one of the Sherman Act; 9 what

is the relevant market; what portion of the local market is controlled
by the MLS; assuming the MLS does control a significant market
share, what is the impact of such control upon competition; given
that conditioning MLS access upon Realtor board membership restrains competition, is the restraint unreasonable'?
First, this article will examine the most significant cases addressing MLS access restrictions. In the following section, the rule of
reason as a framework for analysis of the MLS access issue will be
examined in detail, including the significance of defining and determining the relevant market and consideration of less restrictive
alternatives to Realtor board membership as a condition to MLS access. Finally, the recent decision of Pomanowski v. Monmouth
County Board of Realtors20 will be evaluated as an example of an
empirical approach to the MLS access issue.
II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE MLS ACCESS ISSUE
Until very recently, the courts have not dealt with the MLS access issue in its most fundamental aspect, namely, whether conditioning MLS access upon Realtor board membership in and of itself unreasonably restrains trade. The early cases on MLS access involved
outright exclusion on the part of the Realtor defendants. For example, in the leading case of GriUo v. Board of Realtors of Plainfield
Area,2 a licensed real estate broker brought an action against the
'" Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Cedar Rapids Real Estate Bd., [1979] TRADE REC. REP. (CCH)
63,012 (D. Iowa 1979); Matin County Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d
833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976); Glendale Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Hounsell, 72 Cal. App. 3d 210,
139 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1977); Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 175 N.J. Super.
212, 417 A.2d 1119 (Ch. Div. 1980); Kaechele, Exclusion From Real Estate MLS as Antitrust
Violations, 14 CALIF. L. REv. 298 (1978); Miller & Shedd, Do Antitrust Laws Apply to Real
Estate Brokerage Industry? 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 313 (1979).
18 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
19 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).

"

175 N.J. Super. 212, 417 A.2d 1119 (Ch. Div. 1980).
91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. Div.. 1966).
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defendant Realtor board for relief against his exclusion from the
board's MLS. Over a period of eight years, the plaintiff had submitted numerous applications, being rejected each time.22 The court
noted several restrictions to admission to the board which, in effect,
precluded his access to the MLS since one had to join the Realtor
board as a condition to participate in the MLS.' While acknowledging that an MLS provides an effective method for conducting real
estate transactions, the court characterized the board's MLS rules and
regulations requiring members to restrict information about properties for sale only to other members as a group boycott or a concerted refusal to deal.24 Although group boycotts fall into a per se
category, the case was one of first impression leading the court to
examine the restraint under the rule of reason.75
The GriUo court listed in detail the anti-competitive effects of
non-MLS access. Nonmembers of the board, who are consequently
precluded from the MLS, are at a competitive disadvantage because
they "may lose the listings of [homeowners] who are interested in
displaying their property to the widest possible audience." 26 Prospective buyers interested in a broad selection will most likely patronize a
board member with MLS access "who can offer all the properties
listed with other board members in the area." 27 The nonmember
broker is precluded from access to a significant percentage of the
properties for sale in the board's chartered territory because many of
these properties will simply be unknown to the nonmember broker.
The court likened the MLS to an inventory of goods without which a
businessman cannot survive. Accordingly, the court held that the
board's MLS tended to "stifle rather than promote competition" ' ' and
was not justified in light of the comprehensive scheme of public
regulation.29
I
2

Id. at 206, 219 A.2d at 637.
Id. at 211, 219 A.2d at 640. The court listed the restrictions upon membership as follows:
Several applications for membership, in addition to that of plaintiff, have been
voted down; one, I am sure, because the applicant was a Negro. There is also the
very substantial initiaton fee of $1,000. There is a strong inference that the amount
has been set as a barrier against applications which would otherwise be filed. No
showing was made by the Board that such a fee bears any reasonable relation to the
cost of admitting a new member. Hurdles are placed, too, in the way of newcomers. Art. III, § 2 of the Board's constitution fixes a waiting period of one year for
the licensee who comes from elsewhere, opens his own office in the area and desires to apply for active membership.

Id.
Id.at
Id. at
Id. at
r id.
Id. at
- Id. at
2

218-19, 219 A.2d at 644.
219, 219 A.2d at 645.
222, 219 A.2d at 646.
223, 219 A.2d at 647.
222-23, 219 A.2d at 646-47.
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Similarly, in Oates v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing
Service, Inc.,' a real estate broker brought an action to compel the
MLS to admit him as a member. Quoting from Grillo, the Oates
court reinforced the adverse impact of the denial of MLS access.31 In
light of the application of antitrust principles in Grillo, the court invoked the concept of per se illegality, holding that the MLS's exclusion of the plaintiff restrained competition and that the members of
the MLS had engaged in a classic concerted refusal to deal;32 yet
even though the Oates court deemed the per se approach warranted,
it decided to analyze the defendant's contentions under the rule of
reason as an alternative ground for its decision.'
The court characterized the defendant's membership restrictions
limiting MLS access to board shareholders as an absolute bar to the
admission of new members, going beyond GriUo where, theoretically
at least, the membership requirements were capable of fulfillment.
The requirements in Oates amounted to a club totally closed to
outsiders.'

Oates was also noteworthy for its view in regard to what constitutes a more than de minimis restraint of trade. The defendant had
argued that it is neither a monopoly nor a "near-monopoly," and that
therefore the antitrust laws do not apply in such a situation. With
MLS members comprising as little as 16% of all brokerage firms and
only 20% of dollar volume in the area, the court found the illegality
of the defendant's operation in its tendency to destroy competition,
rather than its mere size or market share.- Furthermore, the court
1

113 N.J. Super. 371, 273 A.2d 795 (Ch. Div. 1971).
Id. at 374-77, 380-82, 273 A.2d at 796-97, 800.
3
Id. at 382-84, 273 A.2d at 796-97.
Id. at 389, 273 A.2d at 805. In a subsequent Pennsylvania decision, Collins v. Main Line
Bd. of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 304 A.2d 493 (1973), the court adhered to its initial characterization of MLS restrictions as per se illegal, finding that the exclusion of nonmembers was a naked
common law restraint of trade. After three membership applications and subsequent denials,
the plaintiff sought an injunction against the Main Line Board's restriction of MLS access to
board members. The exclusionary nature of the case is demonstrated in the defendant's reasons
for denying the plaintiff membership. Id. at 346, 304 A.2d at 494-95. The plaintiff had earlier
brought charges against the defendant board, charging it with discrimination before the Pennsylvania State Human Relations Commission. Although the charge was dismissed by the Commission, the board was characterized by the court as feeling that the plaintiff had maligned its
reputation by bringing the charge. The court would not allow the defendant to retaliate against
the plaintiff for assisting a client in an attempt to assert his constitutional right to petition the
government. Id. Without relying on either GriUo or Oates, the Collins court nevertheless came
to the same conclusion that the effect of non-access to the MLS resulted in a nonmember's
inability to compete in the buying and selling of real estate for clients as effectively as a member of the MLS. Id.
113 N.J. Super. at 392, 273 A.2d at 806.
Id.
31
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found these figures in and of themselves "substantial" and held that
even if "substantiality" of impact were necessary to establish illegality, 20% of dollar volume (some $20,000,000 plus) was sufficient to
satisfy that criterion.'
As outright exclusion cases, Grillo and Oates do not reflect the
MLS access issue in the form that it has appeared in recent cases and
consent decrees: 37 whether allowing all comers to participate in an
MLS as long as all comers "voluntarily" choose Realtor board membership as a condition precedent to participate in the MLS unreasonably restrains trade. This precise issue was addressed in Marin
County Board of Realtors v. Palsson.3
In Palsson, the Realtor board brought an action seeking a
declaratory judgment that its denial of membership to a part-time
broker was valid. Since three-fourths of the active brokers in the area
were board members, this "primarily engaged" rule resulted in Palsson's preclusion from 75% of the market in terms of employment.' 9 In
addition to contesting the part-time work restriction, Palsson sought,
as a completely separate issue, injunctive relief allowing him MLS
4
access without having to join the Realtor board. 0
The Palsson court was aware of the inappropriateness of applying
the per se standard of review to the access rule because it could
3

Id.

' Although lacking significant precedential value, consent decrees ordering MLS access to
any licensed real estate person regardless of Realtor board membership are of interest because
they indicate the availability of less restrictive alternatives under a rule of reason analysis to a
blanket refusal to permit MLS access to all licensed non-Realtor real estate agents. For example, in United States v. Multiple Listing Serv., Portland Bd. of Realtors, [19721 TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH)
74,221 (D. Ore. 1972), the consent decree prohibited conditioning access to the
MLS on Realtor board membership. The decree specifically prohibited requiring membership
in any local, state, or national Realtor board or trade association as a condition for participating
in the MLS. Id. at 93,022. In Westhampton Real Estate Bd., Inc., 944 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REc. REP. (BNA), at D-2 (Dec. 20, 1979), the New York Attorney General charged that the
defendant Realtor board unreasonably restricted access to its MLS by confining it to Realtor
board members only, established unlawful "territorial restrictions on membership, imposed unreasonable fees and dues requirements to create unreasonable barriers to enter the MLS, and
establish unreasonable restrictions on a member's conduct of its business in taking property
listings." Id. In order to avoid litigation that would also have involved allegations of price-fixing,
the Realtor board agreed, among other things, not to confine the use of the MLS to Realtor
board members only. Id.
' 16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976).
3
Id. at 924-25, 549 P.2d 834-35, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 2-3.
' The additional relief sought by Palsson clearly required the court to deal with the issue
whether conditioning access on Realtor board membership unreasonably restrains trade. This is
evident from the contention made by the defendant board that since the "primarily engaged"
rule was abandoned while the case was pending appeal, the issue before the court was therefore
moot. The court rejected this contention, citing Palsson's alternative basis for relief as a justiciable controversy. Id. at 928-29, 549 P.2d at 837, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
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result in a situation where a trade association "which provides any
economic benefit to its members would be compelled to provide that
same economic benefit to nonmembers."4' Apparently, there was
something especially significant about the role of the MLS in the
hierarchy of benefits offered by the board and its value as a competitive vehicle that in the opinion of the court warranted special consideration of the MLS access issue standing alone under the rule of
reason.
The court then set forth the test for a rule of reason analysis:
1) examine the economic effects of the restraint in conjunction with
2) consideration of possible justifications for the restraint. 42 According to the Palsson court, "the antitrust laws are designed primarily to aid the consumer.""4 This objective manifests itself in a number
of pro-competitive purposes. Competition will yield the optimal
allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices, and the highest
quality goods and services. 4 The Realtor board thus would be able
to meet its burden of justifying its restrictions by demonstrating that
the restraint results in such pro-competitive effects as either lower
prices and/or superior performance in terms of quality of service than
an MLS which operates without conditioning access on Realtor board
membership. These pro-competitive effects, if indeed they exist,
would then be weighed against -the adverse impact on competition
flowing from the restraint: 1) preclusion from 75% of the employing
brokers who are board members giving them MLS access, 2) the preclusion from 35% of all real property in Marin County, and 3) what
has become a standard recognition of the harmful effects of nonaccess to MLS as seen in GriUo and Oates.Viewed in light of this model, the Realtor board fell short of its
burden. The possible justification of making trade association membership desirable by providing attractive benefits, previously
acknowledged as proper by the court, did not lead to an absolute
right to exclude nonmembers from all the benefits an association may
offer. When an association's activities "begin to correspond directly
with and touch upon the business activities of its members, and . . .
the association has the power to shape and influence the economic
environment of its particular market," it subjects itself to antitrust
scrutiny." With 75% of employability affected and 35% of all real
Id. at 931, 549 P.2d at 839, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
4 Id. at 934-35, 549 P.2d at 842, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
43 Id.
" Id. The court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pac. By. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958) to substantiate this proposition.
16 Cal. 3d at 934-35, 549 P.2d at 839, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
Id. at 937, 549 P.2d at 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
41
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property unavailable to nonmembers, the Palsson court had no difficulty in finding that the defendant Realtor board had the "ability to
shape the economic environment of the Marin County residential
brokerage market" in a substantial manner.47 Repeating its acknowledgement that the board had the right to restrict some of its benefits
to members only, the court held that MLS access was so essential to
a broker to be able to effectively compete that all licensed salespersons who choose to use the service must be granted access.4
In elaborating on the application of a rule of reason standard, the
court noted that the rule requires not only a demonstration that a
restraint of trade "relates to a legitimate purpose, but also that it is
reasonably necessary to accomplish that purpose and narrowly tailored to do so." 49 One of the board's proposed justifications for the
restraints on MLS access was that such restraints are designed to
foster the professional and ethical competence of real estate brokers
and salespersons. While the court accepted the legitimacy of such a
laudable goal, it also noted that the need for such oversight was
minimal given California's pervasive state regulation of the real estate
industry.50 Furthermore, the board failed to demonstrate that its restraints on MLS access actually served to enhance professional or
ethical competence to any significant degree. Finally, the restrictions
were so broadly drawn that they failed to take into account that no
matter how competent, ethical or professional a practitioner was, he
was still swept into an all or nothing blanket preclusion. 5' In light of
the anti-competitive effects previously noted, both restraints, the
"primarily engaged" rule and conditioning MLS access on Realtor
board membership, could not withstand rule of reason scrutiny. 2
47 Id. at 938, 549 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12.

48Id.
4" Id.
Id. at 939, 549 P.2d at 845, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12-13.
" Id. See State v. San Diego Bd. of Realtors, No. 375,827 (Super. Ct., San Diego County,
May 23, 1978) (court weighed justifications for MLS access restrictions geared toward ensuring
the upgrading of professional standards and found them insufficient to insulate their anticompetitive effects); notes 146-60 infra and accompanying text.
52 A California Court of Appeals decision further clarified Palsson, holding that conditioning
MLS access on Realtor board membership in and of itself violates the state antitrust laws. In
Glendale Bd. of Realtors v. Hounsell, 72 Cal. App. 3d 210, 139 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1977), the
plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker in California, voluntarily chose not to join the local, state,
and national Realtor trade associations. The Glendale Board of Realtors argued that Palsson
stood for the proposition that only where the joint presence of the two anti-competitive practices (the "primarily engaged" rule and conditioning MLS access on Realtor board membership)
existed were the antitrust laws violated; since Glendale lacked the "primarily engaged" problem, Palsson was not applicable. Id. at 212, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The appellate court rejected
this argument holding that Palsson considered separately under the rule of reason standard the
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Grillo, Oates, and Palsson are representative of the decisions
which have struck down MLS access conditions as unwarranted restraints of trade in violation of the antitrust laws. A number of courts
interpreting state and federal antitrust provisions, however, have arrived at a contrary conclusion. Although a significant number of the
decisions upholding membership restrictions appear to have been
principally premised upon a finding that the MLS possessed an insufficient market power to subject the service to antitrust liability,m
MLS access restrictions have been determined to be valid restraints
which survive rule of reason scrutiny. Two cases arriving at this conclusion, Barrows v. Grand Rapids Real Estate Board' and Iowa ex
rel. Miller v. Cedar Rapids Real Estate Board, deserve mention.
In Barrows, exclusion of a nonmember was held to be reasonable where the nonmember was able to compete effectively and the
majority of sales were made outside the MLS.' The court rejected
the per se rule holding that per se illegality applies only in situations
which exhibit severe restraints of trade and have little or no public
benefit. 57 Although denied Realtor board membership, the plaintiff
in Barrows never questioned why he was rejected nor did he attack
the board's membership requirements as unreasonable. The plaintiff
instead argued that he should be permitted access to the MLS without having to join a private trade association because any requirements imposed which are more exacting than state licensure
provisions would violate the antitrust law. 5' The court found this
argument unpersuasive.
anti-competitive effect of each of these practices and concluded that each violated the state
antitrust law. Id. The only issue in Glendale then was whether the MLS access condition had
economic effects similar to those found in Palsson. Id. at 212-13, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 832. The
Glendale court found the anti-competitive effects of non-access to the MLS to be substantial
and not outweighed by any pro-competitive effects. Moreover, the court placed significant
weight on the testimony of a leading Glendale Realtor that a broker practicing his livelihood in
the Glendale board's territory must have access to its MLS in order to compete effectively with
brokers with MLS access. Id.
' See, e.g., Brown v. Indianapolis Bd. of Realtors, [1977-1] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
61,435, at 71,612 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (only one-sixth of brokers and salespeople in trade area were
board members and only one-sixth of board members participated in MLS); Grempler v. Multiple Listing Bureau, Inc., 258 Md. 419, 266 A.2d I (Md. Ct. App. 1970) (plaintiff operated
branch office in county where NILS not dominant factor in marketplace as evidenced by small
percentage of eligible brokers who participated; of 72 licensed brokers, only 12 were associated
with MLS).
51 Mich. App. 75, 214 N.W.2d 532 (1974).
[1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,012 (D. Iowa 1979).
51 Mich. App. 75, 93, 214 N.W.2d 532, 540 (1974).
Id. at 94-95, 214 N.W.2d at 542.
51 Id. at 80, 214 N.W.2d at 534. See also Kaechele, Exclusion From Real Estate MLS As
Antitrust Violations, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 298, 311-12 (1978).
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Moreover, under a rule of reason analysis, the court determined
that the restraints did not violate the antitrust laws. The court viewed
the restraints as valid because: there was no monopoly; there was
substantial competition between board members using the MLS;
there was no specific claim of discrimination concerning board membership; there was no intent nor purpose to injure nonmember
competitors. 59 In sum, without any empirical substantiation of the
Realtors' position, the court nevertheless concluded that the experience and full-time commitment requirements for Board membership
were "reasonably designed to assure that new members will be professionally competent and will generate their share of listings." '
The decision by the United States District Court for the District
of Iowa in Iowa ex rel Miller v. Cedar Rapids Real Estate Board61
offers the most direct support for the proposition that MLS access
conditioned upon Realtor board membership in and of itself does not
violate the antitrust laws unencumbered by complicating attendant
circumstances. Unfortunately, the Cedar Rapids opinion is marred by
inconsistency and incompleteness. The most glaring omission in the
Cedar Rapids opinion is the court's total lack of consideration, even
recognition of, Palsson which dealt with the identical issue before the
court. Nor did the Iowa court consider National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States' which established impact on competition as the key criterion, even overriding alleged ethical concerns, in a restraint of trade situation examined under a rule of
reason standard.63
In Cedar Rapids, much was made of the contention that if nonRealtors were allowed access to the MLS without a corresponding
obligation to devote volunteer time to the board, it would be doubtful that the board could continue to generate the amount of volunteer
time on which the operation of the board and MLS depends.6 While
this may be true with reference to that board, such a view completely
1 51 Mich. App. at 94-95, 214 N.W.2d at 542.
6 Id.
61 [1979] TRADE REc. REP. (CCH)
63,012 (D. Iowa 1979).
6 435 U.S. 679 (1978). For a discussion of the importance of the holding in Professional
Engineers, see notes 150-54 infra and accompanying text.
63 The court's determination that the requirement of board membership did not substantially
interfere with competition may have been decidedly influenced by the fact that only a small
percentage of real estate in the area was handled by the MLS. [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,012, at 77,042. Indeed, one court has referred to this decision as representative of cases
where the court had upheld the restrictions because the MLS lacked sufficient market power.
United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [19801 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,624, at 77,310
n.40 (5th Cir. 1980). See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
[1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,012, at 77,043.
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ignored the fact that in California, Oregon and New York such an
unsupported conclusion does not apply to the MLS.
The Cedar Rapids opinion stated that "[u]nless MLS participants
and the public are assured that the board's Code of Ethics apply, and
recourse to the board's grievance and arbitration committees is available, neither brokers, nor the public, are likely to use the MLS."
Yet the court failed to reveal its basis for accepting a conclusion that
the public relies upon or is even aware of a Realtor "Code of Ethics"
in deciding with whom to deal in the real estate transaction process.67
It is more probable that consumers have come to perceive the word
"Realtor" as generic in that the term merely designates anyone
licensed to practice real estate brokerage. Furthermore, Realtor
board grievance and arbitration procedures rarely deal with consumer
complainants; rather, boards overwhelmingly oversee disputes among
brokers with the vast majority of such grievances and arbitrations involving commission disputes between brokers.6

I See, e.g., United States v. Multiple Listing Serv., Portland Bd. of Realtors, [1972] TRADE
REc. REP. (CCH) 74,221, at 93,021 (D. Ore. 1972); Marin County Bd. of Realtors v. Palsson,
16 Cal. 3d 920, 549 P.2d 833, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1976); Glendale Bd. of Realtors v. Hounsell, 72
Cal. App. 3d 210, 139 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1976); State v. San Diego Bd. of Realtors, No. 375,827
(Super. Ct., San Diego County, May 23, 1978); In re Westhampton Real Estate Bd., Inc., 944
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at D-2 (Dec. 20, 1979). It should be noted that at least 10
MLS' in New Jersey currently allow any licensed real estate person to have MLS access regardless of Realtor board membership. See note 157 infra.
' [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,012, at 77,042.
7 The Realtor Code of Ethics does little to improve on state rules, regulations and statutes
dealing with the licensure and practice of real estate. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-6 & 15-7
(West 1976); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:15-1.1 to 1.32. Such duplication accounts for courts' concerns over a private trademark group's power to control an industry through the leverage applied to MLS access via acceptance of a code of ethics. This is the preemption argument by
which numerous courts have recognized that state real estate commissions are the proper vehicles for deciding, in effect, who should practice real estate. See generally Grillo, 91 N.J. Super.
202, 219 A.2d 635; Collins v. Main Line Bd. of Realtors, 452 Pa. 342, 304 A.2d 493 (1973).
Realtor ethics differ from state rules and regulations in one important respect: although the
Realtor Code of Ethics adds virtually nothing to the body of agency, contract, and tort law that
forms the basis for the legal underpinnings of real estate practice, the Code includes numerous
anti-competitive provisions. For example, the Code prohibits negotiation by other than the
listing broker, regardless of the will of the seller. It prohibits brokers from soliciting an employing or independent contractor of another Realtor. It forbids Realtors from soliciting a listing
which is currently listed exclusively with another broker. A member of a Realtor board binds
himself to mandatory arbitration of disputes where Realtors monitor practitioner behavior. Such
a situation permits a private trademark group with its clear economic self-interest to control
matters in dispute which often results in overzealous and overbroad prohibition of conduct that
is not clearly undesirable. See Rose, OccupationalLicensing: A Framework for Analysis, 1979
ARIz. ST. L.J. 189, 199. For further analysis of the importance of adherence to the Realtor Code
of Ethics as a justification for MLS access, see notes 146-60 infra and accompanying text.
I Arbitration, A Service of a Board of Realtors, 21 N.J. REALTOR 1 (Oct. 1979).
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The Cedar Rapids court expressed concern that the public, as
well as brokers, would foresake the MLS without the Realtor Code of
Ethics standing behind it. Yet the court accepted a 26% market share
for the MLS (all real estate, not just residential). Consequently, with
74% of all real estate sold in Linn County, Iowa, bypassing the MLS,
there appears to be an inherently contradictory perception by the
court of "assurance" and "confidence" on the part of "brokers and the
public" in the Realtors' operation of the MLS. 9
Summing up the judicial treatment of MLS access in general and
conditioning MLS access on Realtor board membership in and of itself in particular, the more recent decisions seem to support the position that 1) where market control in the form of market share is evident, 2) non-access to the MLS results in anti-competitive effects and
3) the private trade association can offer no more justification for conditioning MLS access on Realtor board membership beyond trade
association puffery and propaganda, the condition precedent is likely
to be held an unreasonable restraint of trade.
III. THE RULE OF REASON: A FRAMEWORK FOR
ANALYSIS OF THE MLS ACCESS ISSUE
In examining the requirement that one must join a Realtor board
in order to gain access to an MLS, the rule of reason provides the
framework necessary to analyze such a restraint's impact on competition. Section one 70 of the Sherman Act and section 56:9-3 of the New
Jersey Statutes Annotated 7' both proscribe agreements or combinations in restraint of trade. Competition is the touchstone of the Sherman Act and it reaches all unreasonable restraints on competition.7"
To determine whether conduct unreasonably restrains competition,
courts apply a balancing test in considering a number of factors integral to the application of the rule of reason.73
Under a rule of reason analysis, the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff to show that the conduct complained of is anti-competitive,
that less restrictive alternatives are available, and that the restraint is

' [19791 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,012, at 77,043.
70 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
"' N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
72 National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1911); Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 628,
637 (D.D.C. 1979); Grillo v. Board of Realtors of Plainfield Area, 91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d
635 (Ch. Div. 1966).
7'National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
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therefore unreasonable. r In order to gauge the competitive impact
of the restraint, a court must first evaluate the market power of the
defendant and the overall structure of the market. 7' An evaluation of
the alleged justifications for the agreement and whether the restraints
imposed are necessary to attain the goal sought to be achieved
through the agreement is then undertaken. Consideration of less restrictive alternatives is thus an important factor to be evaluated.
These factors, integral to a rule of reason analysis of the MLS access
issue, will be individually examined in the following sections.
A. The Relevant Market
In order to assess the market power of a particular MLS, and its
potential for causing anti-competitive harm, the definition of the relevant market is, of necessity, the threshold determination. In the
context of the MLS access issue, there are clear market delineations
to be had for antitrust purposes. 6 The party challenging the restraint
should have no greater burden than to demonstrate the existence of a
market which provides a clear and substantial commercial advantage
to its participants to the exclusion of nonparticipants. 7 Furthermore,
" DeVoto v. Pacific Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 618 F.2d 1340, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980); Cowley v.
Braden Indus., Inc., No. 77-3272 (9th Cir. Jan. 8, 1980); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., No. 79-4131 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1980); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 385
(9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 936 (1979); Mutual Fund Investors v. Putnam Management Co., 553 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1977).
11 United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 527 (1948); Harold Friedman, Inc. v.
Thorofare Mkts., 587 F.2d 127, 143 (3d Cir. 1978); II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
500, at 321 (1978).
76 Interestingly, few of the reported decisions to date appear to have had to grapple in detail
with the relevant market as an issue. But see Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 175 N.J. Super. 212, 417 A.2d 1119 (Ch. Div. 1980) discussed in text accompanying notes
190-218 infra. For example, in Oates the court had a clear concept of the scope of the geographic market-the chartered territory in the form of assigned municipalties or towns covered
by the defendant MLS. Oates, 113 N.J. Super. at 375, 273 A.2d at 797. In Palsson, the California Supreme Court, apparently with no issue taken by either side, considered as relevant the
residential housing market in Manin County. Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 935, 549 P.2d at 842, 130
Cal. Rptr. at 10. The court in State v. San Diego Bd. of Realtors characterized the residential
housing market as one in which large numbers of listings are necessary in order for a typical
broker to compete effectively. The court perceived that a residential buyer will seek a broker
who has access to as many listings as possible and went on to state that no evidence has been
presented that such a situation prevails in the investment or commercial market. State v. San
Diego Bd. of Realtors, No. 375,827, slip op. at 9 (Super. Ct., San Diego County, May 23,
1978). The court concluded that clients of investment or commercial property brokers rely
much more upon the expertise and experience of the broker than upon his inventory of listings
or access to an MLS. Id. See also United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [1980] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH)
63,624 at, 77,309 (5th Cir. 1980) (undisputed that relevant product market was
residential real estate brokerage services and that relevant geographic market was county in
which service operated).
I L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 64 (1977).
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although for every product or service substitutes exist, a relevant
market cannot encompass such an infinite range; the scope of the
market must be drawn narrowly to exclude any other product or service to which, within reason, only a limited or incidental number of
buyers will turn.7 1 Within these parameters then, the relevant market issue must be examined in two respects: the scope of the product
market and the geographic market.
1. Product Market
The Brown Shoe, Inc. v. United States79 decision serves as the
landmark for providing criteria to isolate and define the relevant product market. In that case the Supreme Court recognized the economically significant submarkets of a product in order to determine the
relevant anti-competitive effects of a challenged restraint."0 "The
boundaries of such . .. submarket[s] may be determined by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product's [or service's]
peculiar characteristics and uses, unique facilities, distinct customers
and vendors and their respective specialized needs.""1 Within a
broad market such as real estate, distinct submarkets or market segments exist which constitute separate markets for antitrust purposes,
the most significant of which is the distinction between the consumer
and commercial/industrial submarkets.
From a marketing perspective, one of the most fundamental
ways of segmenting an overall product or service market 2 is to divide
it into consumer and industrial/commercial submarkets.'
These two

7s Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 612 n.31 (1953).
- 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
o Id. at 325-26. The court defined three distinct submarkets of shoes: men's, women's and
children's shoes. Although these three products were combined in some retail outlets, they
were nevertheless determined to constitute three distinct relevant product submarkets for purposes of the antitrust implications of the merger of two shoe companies. Id.
" Id. at 325. Fleer Corp. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., [1980-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
96,160 (E.D.Pa. 1980); United States v. Tracinda Inv. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1093, 1103 (C.D.
Cal. 1979).
'2 Market segmentation is the process of dividing a large heterogenous market (such as real
estate) into several smaller segments which exhibit common characteristics. Each segment requires a special marketing program tailored to its unique market orientation. W. STANTON,
FUNDAMENTALS OF MARKETING 50 (4th ed. 1975). The residential real estate industn is presently
using marketing research to help define the needs of various consumer segments so that new
home construction will be coordinated with readily ascertainable consumer demands, thereby
boosting housing sales. Marketing Research Rescues Depressed Housing Industry, 13
MARKETING NEws 4 (Feb. 8, 1980).
'

W.

STANTON,

supra note 82, at 50.

1981]

MLS AND THE RULE OF REASON

segments are distinct primarily because of the different buyer behavior characteristic of each." 4 While consumers buy products for
their own personal or household use, industrial or commercial buyers
representing business organizations purchase in accordance with functional considerations dictated by their commercial needs.85 Consequently, a seller's marketing program will differ depending upon
whether he is selling to the consumer or to the industrial/commercial
market. 6
Real estate trade association data and trade literature reveal a
recognition of these distinct relevant submarkets in the real estate
industry.8 7 Within the industrial/commercial market, factors important to purchase decisions include capitalization rates, internal rates
of return, pay-back scheduling, amortization, cash flow, and present
value analysis-terminology that is alien to the average consumer."
On the other hand, a buyer in the consumer/residential market relies on substantially different criteria in selecting a house. Whereas
buyers in the industrial/commercial market tend to focus on the
rational and functional, the consumer/residential buyer is motivated
by psychological, emotional, status, and life style needs.8 9 Sales factors will therefore vary depending on the purchaser's characteristics
and circumstances. Real estate brokers realize this and aim their sales
techniques at satisfying these particular desires.9 If the needs of the
market segments were the same there would be no need for such
specialized Realtor designations as Certified Residential Specialist,
Certified Commercial/Investment Member and Certified Real Estate
Broker Manager."
Usually, a broker specializing in consumer/residential sales is not
experienced enough to service the unique needs of an industrial/commercial purchaser.92 For example, since 1963, Denver has had a
s Id. at 52.
Id. at 50.
6 Id.
11Published trade materials are admissable evidence in federal courts. FED. R. EVID.
803(17). Courts presiding over antitrust cases have consistently acknowledged the importance of
such "practical indicia" to determine industry recognition of relevant markets. E.g., Brown
Shoe, 370 U.S. at 325.
See Lyon, ABC's of Investment Analysis, 13 REAL ESTATE TODAY 20 (Feb. 1980) (discussion of commercial buyer's use of property as an investment and corresponding approach a
broker should take to make sale).
" See Hull, A Complete Guide to Qualifying, 13 REAL ESTATE TODAY 39 (Feb. 1980). For
example, economy minded home buyers will want energy efficient homes, while status oriented
purchasers will seek a prestigious location. Id. at 41.
'o See Lyon, supra note 88; Hull, supra note 89.
' See Craig, A Network of Knowledge, 13 REAL ESTATE TODAY 29-30 (Sept. 1980).
See Faraci, Business Seminars: An Exciting Marketing Approach, 13 REAL ESTATE TODAY
45 (Feb. 1980).
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separate commercial listing service. The industrial/commercial
brokerage firms that were part of the primarily residential MLS
needed something more useful to the commercial salesperson.' The
firms doing the greatest proportion of business in industrial/commercial sales did not use the existing MLS because it was not specialized
enough for their use.9
Such an example of the specialized vendor criterion is often significant in delineating the relevant product market. In the recent case
of Photovest v. Fotomat,5 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, after closely analyzing the film processing services offered by the
various retail outlets, concluded that although the end product of the
"drive-thru-kiosk" and the conventional method is virtually identical,
the total service is quite different.9 In particular, the court noted
that the Fotomat vendor is more of a specialist than the salespersons
in drug stores, supermarkets and discount stores that offer film
processing. 9 Not only did the industry itself perceive the "drive
thru" market as a separate entity,' but consumers also perceived the
various film processing outlets as distinct.'
Case law subsequent to the Brown Shoe decision has bolstered
the proposition that consumer's perceptions and characteristics are
important factors in the market definition process. Relying on the
Supreme Court's guidelines, the court in L.G. Balfour Co. v. Federal Trade Commission 100 reasoned that college students buying
fraternity emblematic jewelry had characteristics that differentiated
them from purchasers of other types of jewelry, and thereby composed a submarket of the jewelry market.'0 ' Further, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held, in United States v. Household
Finance Corp., 2 that finance companies make up a distinct market
segment of the personal loan industry because they offer unique

93

Saros, Is There a Future For a Commercial MLS?, 13

REAL ESTATE TODAY

14 (June

1980).
,4

Id.

5 [1979-2]

62,869, at 79,019 (7th Cir. 1979).
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
" Id. at 79,026. The court relied upon the Brown Shoe criteria, see text accompanying notes
79-81 supra, to examine the extent of the relevant market. Id. at 79,025.
7 Id. at 79,026.
98 Id.
99 Id.

'0 442 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1971).
"I Id. at 9-11. The court refused to consider alternative sources of supply because such an
examination ignores the behavior of consumers. Id. at 11.
102 602 F.2d 1255 (7th Cir. 1979).
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services to a class of high risk customers not serviced by other loan
institutions. 103
Additionally, where products or services appear on the surface to
be part of the same market, but differ in terms of price, the difference can scope the relevant market. The Photovest court focused on
distinctive pricing to suggest the existence of a separate submarket.'04
In another vein, based on the differences of average ticket prices,
professional hockey has been held to constitute a market separate
from amateur hockey. "' Taking price as well as customer characteristics into consideration, the Supreme Court has found the promotion
of championship boxing events to constitute a separate submarket of
the entire professional boxing industry."°6 Since the commission
charged for commercial property differs by as much as 50% from the
commission charged for existing residential housing, such a price differential further supports the separation of the consumer and industrial/commercial markets in the real estate industry.
To claim that the relevant product market within which the conditioning of MLS access on Realtor board membership is examined
should encompass all real property-land, commercial, industrial,
investment-therefore does not square with economic realities and
existing case law. There is no question that the overwhelming type of
real estate that passes through an MLS is residential with some smattering of land, commercial and industrial. 107 Furthermore, Realtor
trade literature recognizes that residential consumers behave differently in terms of purchasing decisions than commercial/industrial
purchasers and that service providers to these separate market segments differ in knowledge, ability, and undestanding of each separate
" Id. Similarly, in Affiliated Music Enterprises, Inc. v. Sesac, Inc., 260 F.2d 13 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 831 (1959), the court held that gospel music was a distinct submarket of
the music industry since gospel music appealed to a distinct market segment which did not
recognize any substitutes for their choice of music.
" [1979-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 62,869, at 79,026 (7th Cir. 1979) Fotomat's pricing for
film processing was found to be approximately 20% or more higher than conventional retail
outlets and 50% higher than those of most drug stores and discount outlets. Id. at 79,024.
While this price disparity alone was insufficient to establish a relevant market, the fact that
higher prices did not hinder Fotomat's growth as a company was evidence that it was able to
offer the public a unique service. Id. at 79,026. See also Avnet, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n,
511 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975) (price differential of 25% to 50%
significant factor in court's determination of distinct submarkets for new and rebuilt alternators
and generators).
"I Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp.
462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
"0 International Boxing Club Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).
"o See, e.g., Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 166 N.J. Super. 269, 399
A.2d 990 (App. Div. 1979).
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market." 8 Finally, price or commission charged for Realtor's
services varies as a function of whether the property involved is residential or commercial/industrial-a key variable in delineating market segments. 1
2. Geographic Market
An important factor in scoping the proper geographic market in
cases assessing Realtor Board membership requirements for access to
an MLS is that Realtor Boards have chartered jurisdiction territories
with assignments made by the National Association of Realtors.
Although Realtor boards do not attempt to dictate to MLS participants the areas in which they may solicit listings through airtight exclusive territories, the relatively miniscule number of listings coming
from outside a board's chartered territory in conjunction with such
barriers to entry as nonresident Realtor status "10serve to effectively
scope and protect one board's territorial enclave from another. The
granting of the right to use the term "Realtor" in a specified geographic area is analogous to territorial geographic allocations long
used by distributors and franchisors to protect turf and allocate specific markets among franchisees and customers. Incidental and
peripheral sales outside the chartered territorial jurisdiction of an
MLS do not diminish the forcefulness of protective mechanisms surrounding each board MLS's geographic allocation. "1 Nonresident
Realtor status requires a broker who is already a Realtor in his "home
turf" to become a Realtor twice, three times, etc., or as many times
that it takes to do business in a different board's MLS territory with
all the concomitant dues, fees, and costs. The Realtor-Associate program penalizes an already existing Realtor by attaching a capitation fee
per sales associate of the Realtor which would certainly temper the
expansion-minded Realtor from straying beyond his own well12
protected enclave.
See notes 87-91 supra and accompanying text.
t See notes 104-06 supra and accompanying text.
10 Nonresident Realtor status requires a broker who is a Realtor in one board's chartered
territorial jurisdiction to join additional boards. An expansion-minded Realtor-Broker may join
as many MLS units and Realtor Boards as he wishes, if he can afford to.
" Airtight horizontal territorial allocations would be per se illegal. See, e.g., Professional
Engineers, 435 U.S. at 692.
I To provide just one example of the protective effectiveness of such barriers to entry, the
author is aware of a Realtor in the Plainfield Board territory (obviously a Realtor already since
Plainfield requires board membership for MLS access) who would like to enter the Monmouth
County and Somerset County markets through their respective MLS'. To do so would require
an outlay of $2,600.00 just for board membership costs, part of which expenditures will recur on
an annual basis, exclusive of MLS costs, for access to the three territories. Although a licensed
broker, this Realtor cannot afford to enter the other two markets.
'
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But for the protective barriers erected around each chartered
territory"' it is difficult to fathom the purpose behind such requirements. If one is already a Realtor presumably adhering to the Code
of Ethics in his home turf, one would not expect him to become
immoral, unethical, and deceptive if he takes or sells a listing in
another board's MLS territory. Also, he presumably has Realtor seminars and education programs available to him in his own territory. If
a need should arise to patronize a program in another board territory,
it is not clear why this nonresident Realtor could not simply be assessed the cost to participate in the program since this would not
diminish his ability to compete anywhere in the state.
In the majority of cases, the relevant geographic market is consequently defined by the chartered jurisdiction of the MLS; "4 yet
one of the complicating factors in delineating the geographic market
in an MLS access case is the weight assigned to marginal sales that
occur outside of the chartered territorial jurisdiction. If any and all
sales that pass through the MLS are considered as part of the relevant market, the MLS would not likely account for significant
portion of the sales activity in the market as so defined. Any minimal
sales activity outside of the allocated territory of the MLS would
automatically result in an infinite geographic market since even one
sale or listing from any extremity within a state could conceivably
'3 Such devices resemble territorial protection mechanisms such as profit pass-overs and
areas of primary responsibility. See generally Evans, Area of Primary Responsibility Clauses
and the Anti-Trust Laws, 35 U. Prrr L. REv. 671, 681-84 (1974); Schildkraut, Responsibility
and Other Territorial Restrictions in Channels of Distribution Under the Antitrust Laws: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 11 COLUM. J.L. & SOCIAL PROBLEMS 509 (1975); Trombetta,
Distribution Practices Meet A Revitalized Sherman Act, reprinted in R. LuscH, CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES IN MARKETINC CHANNELS 113 (1979). The case of Superior Bedding v. Serta Ass'n, 353
F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. I11. 1972), illustrates the concept of primary responsibility. Serta was
primarily a licensor of patents, trademarks and trade names for bedding products. Id. at 1145.
Prior to 1968, Serta granted to Superior Bedding and other licensees the exclusive right to
manufacture and sell Serta products in prescribed territories. Id. After a consent agreement in
which the territorial allocations were declared unlawful, the licensees still held on to their
former territories changed to "areas of primary responsibility." Id. at 1147. The difference was
that the licensees were no longer absolutely restricted to their own territories. The area of
primary responsibility secured each licensee from excessive encroachment. This territorial protection was accomplished through a "profit pass-over" plan. Id. at 1150. Expansion-minded
licensees were penalized for their territorial intrusions by being required to "pass-over" a percentage of gross sales to compensate the "invaded" licensee for loss of advertising expenditures,
sales effort and "goodwill." Id. Similarly, non-Resident Realtor status and the Realtor-Associate
program can be used as surrogate profit pass-over and area of primary responsibility devices to
temper enthusiasm for Realtors seeking to penetrate a chartered territorial jurisdiction other
than their own "home turf."
"1 See, e.g., United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [1980] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,624, at 77,310 n.39 (5th Cir. 1980); Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 935, 549 P.2d at 842, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 10; Oates, 113 N.J. Super. at 375, 273 A.2d at 797.
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wind up in any MLS. This complication, however, should be resolved
by looking at sales percentages and the economic realities of the marketplace.
The impact of incidental and peripheral sales outside the relevant geographic area was evaluated in Battle v. Liberty National
Life Insurance Co."' In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found that an attempt to monopolize claim was adequately
stated in spite of mere conclusory allegations establishing a relevant
geographic market." 6 In language particularly suited to the MLS access issue the court acknowledged that while "there might be some
limited excursions outside the territorial boundaries . . . the perimeters of the 'exact spot' of a relevant market need not be outlined. It
is enough to show a relevant area in which the defendants might
exclude competition." 17
Even with 20% of sales outside the market area, the relevant
market was still held to be where the bulk of sales were made in
Donald B. Rice Tire Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp."' In Rice Tire, a
dealer sued a tire manufacturer alleging that termination of his dealership constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
the Sherman Act." 9 The evidence indicated that in 1972 the plaintiff
competed almost exclusively within a 150 mile radius of Frederick,
Maryland. By 1977, however, approximately 20% of his sales occurred outside of this area. 2 ' In assessing the competitive consequences of the restraint, the district court nevertheless defined the
relevant geographic market as the Frederick area since it was within
this area that the "great bulk" of the local distributor's business was
conducted. 121
The test applied in Rice Tire would serve to limit the relevant
geographic market for MLS access cases. Instead of woodenly expanding the market to include a distant area merely because a single
I' 493

F.2d 39 (5th Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 503 F.2d 567 (1975).

at 45-46.
Id. See also United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 233 F. Supp. 475, 487-88, 495 (E.D.
Wis. 1964), rev'd, 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
118483 F. Supp. 750(D. Md. 1980).
116 Id.
17

"t9 Id.

at 751.

Id. at 752.
121 Id. at 756. The court also cited professors Areeda and Turner for the proposition that "two
areas are ordinarily separate markets where there are no or only episodic sales between them."
II "P. AREEDA & D. TuRNEn, ANTITRUST LAW 523, at 358 (1978). See United States v. Yellow
Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225-26 (1947); United States v. National City Lines, 186 F.2d 562,
567-68 (7th Cir. 1951). A relevant geographic market could even be as small or narrow as a
section of a city-a downtown theatre district was held to be a relevant geographic submarket
in William Goldman Theatres, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 150 F.2d 738 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 811 (1948).
121
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listed property comes from that area, the geographic market would
be confined to the territory representing the "bulk" of the business of
the MLS.
Entry barriers may also assist in scoping a relevant geographic
market.2 For example, where large promotional and advertising
costs are necessary to introduce a product into a new territory, these
costs may create significant barriers to entry into that territory, thereby scoping the territory as a distinct geographic market."z Analogous
to the burdensome cost barriers to product marketing are the barriers
which are imposed upon Realtors who participate in one MLS and
seek access to a second chartered MLS jurisdiction. Generally,
nonresident Realtor status and Realtor-Associate standing are prerequisites for Realtors and Realtor Associates to gain access to any
additional MLS markets regardless of the fact that they apparently
already adhere to the Realtor Code of Ethics and can partake of Realtor board benefits and services offered by their own local boards.
These barriers to entry therefore suggest an attempt to protect territories from outside competition while not going as far as establishing
airtight horizontal territorial allocations which would result in a per se
violation and potential criminal liability. While a Realtor board controlled MLS may accept a marginal amount of listings outside its
chartered territorial jurisdiction, clearly the board has the capacity to
act anti-competitively on its home ground. Local Realtor boards effectively assure that the bulk of listings and sales in an MLS territory do
pass through the "home" MLS with minimal interference from outsiders. It is therefore apparent that the chartered territorial jurisdiction of an MLS is the appropriate geographic market in which to
assess the effect on competition.
B. Effect of Non-Access: Survival or
Significant Competitive Advantage?
Under a rule of reason standard, it is important to recognize how
significant the business advantage in the relevant market must be in
order to invoke the antitrust laws, particularly within the context of a
"z Elzinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation in Antimerger Suits,
18 ANTrrRUST BULL. 45 (1973). Certain barriers to entry in a market area require that such an
area be designated the relevant geographic market, even though the product or service is
actually distributed or offered more widely. Brown, Relevant Geographic Market Delineation:
The InterchangeabilityStandard in Cases Arising in Section 2 of the Sherman Act and Section 7
of the Clayton Act, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1152, 1159.
" In United States v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 440 F. Supp. 221 (E.D. Pa. 1976), the district
court found cost barriers to be a significant factor in its definition of a relevant geographic
market. Id. at 229. See generally Elzinga & Hogarty, supra note 122, at 61.
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trade association claiming that nonmembers seeking access to its
advantages do not do so out of any desperate need to survive. In the
context of the MLS access issue, the nature of the competitive advantage is important since the established board members may claim that
nonmembers seeking access to its resources do not have a legitimate
business need for these services and are not injured by the membership restriction. Several noteworthy cases, however, demonstrate
that it is the existence of a significant competitive advantage, rather
than merely the inability to survive without membership, that is the
key criterion for antitrust purposes.
In a leading Supreme Court decision, Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange," the New York Stock Exchange denied the plaintiff nonmembers of the Exchange the right to have a direct wire phone connection with members. The Supreme Court determined that an
arrangement which deprived the plaintiffs of a valuable business service which they needed in order to compete effectively was violative
of the Sherman Act.'
Courts addressing the MLS access issue have directly considered
the nature of the competitive advantage required to invoke the antitrust laws. In Palsson, the California Supreme Court found that a
rule which conditioned MLS access upon Realtor membership
seriously hampered the competitive effectiveness of non-Realtor
licensed brokers and salespersons.'26 In keeping with the antagonism
toward restraints which work a competitive disadvantage, the Palsson
court held that a trade association's freedom to exclude competitors
from access to significant competitive benefits is limited by the antitrust laws when "its activities begin to correspond directly with and
touch upon the business activities of its members" and where "the
association has the power to shape and influence the economic environment of its particular market."'27 Because access to the Realtor
Board is important to nonmembers' ability to compete effectively, the
court concluded that such access could not be denied to salesmen
simply because they operated on a part time basis."
Similarly, in Collins v. Main Line Board of Realtors," the court
characterized the test of the impact of MLS nonaccess as follows: "In
effect, a nonmember [of MLS] cannot compete in the buying and

"

373 U.S. 341 (1963).
Id. at 347.

Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 935, 549 P.2d at 842, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
Id. at 937, 549 P.2d at 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
t21Id. at 940, 549 P.2d at 845, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
'
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" 452 Pa. 342, 304 A.2d 493 (1973).
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selling of real estate for clients as effectively as a member of the
appellee corporation." "3 In short, the test of access to a competitive
vehicle has never been whether an entity could survive without
membership, but whether membership constitutes a significant business advantage.
C. The Anti-Competitive Impact of
Non-Access to the MLS
As noted, a key factor under a rule of reason analysis is to ascertain whether the restraint has an anti-competitive impact.' Whether
a licensed real estate broker or salesperson is not participating in an
MLS either as a result of an arbitrary exclusion or voluntary choice,
the anti-competitive impact of such nonaccess is clear and has been
recognized by the courts. 32 Where it is established that the MLS
controls sufficient market share to make non-access economically disadvantageous, the anti-competitive impact is tantamount to judicial
notice. For example, in Oates, the court found a tendency to destroy
competition with as little as 20% of the dollar volume of sales produced in the area per year (approximately $20 million) precluded to
the plaintiff.'Requiring brokers to join the board in order to obtain access to
the MLS effectively limits a homeowner in his selection of a listing
broker. If the homeowner prefers broker X but broker X is not a
member of the board, thereby precluding him from MLS, the
homeowner must deal with a broker who is a board member or else
forego advantages of MLS exposure. The advantages of MLS access
are described in Grillo:
Plaintiff and others who are nonmembers of defendant Board are
placed at a competitive disadvantage as a result of the defendants'
action in combination. Nonmember brokers, unable to provide the
advantages of the multiple listing system, may lose the listings of
sellers who are interested in displaying their property to the

widest possible audience. The prospective buyer who is interested
in a broad selection will most likely go to a Board member who
130

452 Pa. at 348, 304 A.2d at 496.

"I See text accompanying notes 72-75 supra. See also note 149 infra.
12 Palsson,
16 Cal. 3d at 935-36, 549 P.2d at 842, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 10;Glendale Bd. of
Realtors v. Hounsell, 72 Cal. App. 3d at 212-13, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 832; Oates, 113 N.J. Super.
at 381-82, 273 A.2d at 800-01; Grillo, 91 N.J. Super. at 222-23, 219 A.2d at 646-47; Austin,
Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70 COLUM. L. REV.
1331 (1970); Kaechele, Exclusion from Real Estate Multiple Listing Services as Antitrust Violations, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 314-15 (1978).
1 Oates, 113 N.J. Super. at 391-92, 273 A.2d at 806.
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can offer him all the properties listed with other Board members in
the area. The nonmember broker will not be able to serve effectively the prospective buyers who do come to him. He is precluded from offering for sale a high percentage of the properties
which are for sale in the Board's area. Many of the properties for
sale will be unknown to the nonmember broker-although the
Board member has easy access to this same information. If the
non-member broker does learn of a property which has been multiple listed, and finds a buyer for it, he will not be able to make
the sale. The selling owner, already committed to pay a commission to a Board member, cannot afford to sell through the
nonmember broker and pay another commission to him."

Brokers and salespersons are barred from MLS access unless
they pay substantial sums to the local board, state, and national trade
associations which eventually must be recovered in the commission
charged to consumers. These monies have nothing to do with operation of the MLS itself, and are at least partially used for political
lobbying or other activities which many brokers and salespersons
would not otherwise financially support.
In 1973, the Realtor-Associate program was adopted by the
National Association of Realtors (NAR), entitling licensed salespersons
to membership in the NAR. On the surface, it appeared that this
program allowed any salesperson, if he so desired, to be a member of
a local board and a state association. In practice, however, this program forces licensed salespersons to join the trade association; if they
do not "voluntarily" choose to join, the brokers they are affiliated
with are assessed dues on a per salesperson basis. In effect, Realtor
brokers reduce their dues by the amount of the dues paid by the
Realtor-Associate salespersons affiliated with them. 3 ' The significance and correlation of the money involved and Realtor lobby power
suggest at least another motive for conditioning MLS access on Realtor board membership other than a concern for competence and
ethics.
For example, in Monmouth County, 3 6 fees to join the Realtor
board include $250 for application, $200 per year for a membership
fee, a $500 service registration fee charge, and a $360 annual broker
subscription fee; charges to use the MLS are extra.'1 7 With the

" Grillo, 91 N.J. Super. at 222, 219 A.2d at 646.
" North, The Law: How it Affects Realtors and Member Boards, NAR at 27-33 (1974).
Monmouth County was the setting for the Pomanowski decision. See notes 190-218 infra
and accompanying text.
" Ellis, Appeal Expected in MLS Case, The Sunday Record, July 20, 1980, § D, at 1 col. 4.
L'
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membership in the Monmouth County Board broken down into
approximately 200 brokers and 1,700 salespersons (who are assessed
$40 per capita) the Monmouth County Board brings into the trade
association's coffers about $330,000 a year. Multiply this figure by 20
more counties in New Jersey and then by 50 states and one can gain
an appreciation for Realtor fear of losing the hundreds of millions of
dollars generated by this "voluntary" program. 13
Furthermore, the correlation with the Realtor Political Action
Committee (RPAC) is also unmistakably clear. Current figures indicate that RPAC has surpassed other large organizations in political
contributions. Not only is RPAC the largest political action committee, but as of January 31, 1979, Realtors are the largest contributor to
national candidates' campaigns. 39 In 1978, for the first time, RPAC
contributed more than one million dollars to candidates for federal
office throughout the country. Such an awesome display of contributory largesse has been accomplished by only one other organization40
the American Medical Association.
The effect of conditioning MLS access on Realtor membership is
to foreclose both sources of supply and potential customers to the
nonmember. Thus, the greater the market share and market power of
the Realtors in controlling the MLS, the greater will be the foreclosure of the market to the nonmember and the greater the impact of
the Realtor boards' anti-competitive conduct.
D. The Rule of Reason: Promote Competition More Than
Suppress It-But Does It Include Price Competition?
In the decisions which have held conditioning MLS access on
Realtor board membership to be a reasonable restraint of trade, the
courts appear to have concluded without proof or analysis that the
condition promotes competition or benefits the consumer. 4' As a
basic tenet of antitrust law, however, there is no question that price
competition is in the consumer's interest. Yet, throughout the nation
" Compare these figures with the decline in American Medical Association membership,
partially attributable to the doubling of annual dues to $250, not a small sum to young doctors.
Reinhold, AMA Under Pressure, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1980, § Al, at 11.
13 The Year Ahead: An Interview with Ralph W. Pritchard, 13 REAL ESTATE TODAY 11-12
(Jan. 1980).
" Wasinger, Winning in the Washington Hardball League, 13 REAL ESTATE TODAY 18 (July
1980).
' ' See, e.g., Iowa ex rel. Miller v. Cedar Rapids Real Estate Bd., Inc., [1979] TRADE REC.
REP. (CCH)
63,012 (D. Iowa 1979) (court summarily concluded that board's denial of MLS
access to non-members did not limit customers' choice of real estate brokers); Brown v. Indianapolis Bd. of Realtors, [1977-11 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 61,435 (S.D. Ind. 1977) (court failed
to discuss competitive impact of membership restriction).
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as well as in New Jersey, Realtor commissions are set, with remarkable uniformity, at either 6 or 7%, regardless of the skill of the
broker or the difficulty of selling a particular home.'
The Palsson court was particularly astute in appreciating the interrelationship among control of access and organizational structure,
codes of ethics, mandatory arbitration, subtle peer group pressure,
and inherent trade association power and the way these structural
components can permeate broker behavior thereby influencing commission rates:
This narrowing of choice may have an effect on the commissions a
consumer must pay for brokerage service. Although no evidence
has been offered on this issue, a nonmember, particularly a parttime broker not entirely dependent on real estate for his income,
may be willing to accept a fee lower than the prevailing commis-

sion. Moreover, he may be less subject to the informal and often
unspoken peer group pressure that some commentators indicate is
responsible for maintaining standard prices in many industries. In

short, the regulations imposed by the board have a deleterious
effect both on competitors and consumers.1
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that competition
ultimately will produce lower prices. In a now famous passage, Justice Black wrote that:
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the

unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest
quality and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic political and social institutions.144

Competition is the most desirable method of quality control,
pricing, and resource allocation; the consumer has the final say, while
providers compete for his favor in terms of price as well as quality."5
It would therefore seem that the fostering of price competition should

'4

Minard, Why George Babbitt Should be Smiling in His Grave,

FORBES,

Sept. 4, 1978, at

4.
Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 937, 549 P.2d at 843, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 11.
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (emphasis added).
1 In a recent speech delivered before the New England Antitrust Conference, former Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti stated that competition "is a process that works to meet the
needs of consumers by leaving choices about price, manner of distribution and innovation to the
competitors themselves." B. CIVILErFn, LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON 18 (Nov. 26, 1979).
143
144
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be a key variable in examining a Realtor board's anti-competitive conduct under a rule of reason standard. Unfortunately, other than the
Palsson court, no court has delved into the question of whether conditioning MLS access on Realtor membership promotes price competition.
E. Analysis of the Justification for Conditioning
MLS Access on Realtor Board Membership
Once it has been ascertained that an agreement which restrains
trade has in fact been executed, an evaluation of the proferred justifications for the agreement will be undertaken. Proponents of MLS
access restrictions have argued that they may properly strive to establish and improve standards for their occupation. "6 By restricting an
MLS to board members and subjecting them to the Realtor Code of
Ethics, Realtors seek to assure buyers and sellers entrusting their
property to Realtor efforts that their affairs will be handled by
allegedly competent, qualified, and honest salespeople. Realtors also
claim that Realtor board member brokers should not be compelled to
cooperate on sales with brokers who are not forced to adhere to the
Code of Ethics since such persons are allegedly not as trustworthy
nor as competent as Realtors.
There is nothing wrong with seeking to promote professionalism
or to prevent deception or fraud. The important issue here, however,
is only whether conditioning MLS access on Realtor board membership promotes competition in the market for residential real estate
brokerage and, if so, whether that positive impact, if any, on competition outweighs the anti-competitive aspects of the restraint. 47
Since the purpose of the Sherman Act and the New Jersey Antitrust
Act is to promote competition,'48 the courts are not likely to accept
alleged justifications that restrain competition on non-economic
grounds. The inquiry mandated by the rule of reason is simply
whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition
or one that suppresses competition.'49
14

91 N.J. Super. 202, 219 A.2d 635 (Ch. Div. 1966).

"I See Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 627, 649-50 (D.D.C. 1979)

for the proposition that the antitrust laws do not prohibit trade associations from seeking to
prevent incompetence or unethical conduct; however, the antitrust laws do mandate that significantly anti-competitive restraints imposed by such groups cannot be justified by reference to
social goals other than competition. Id. See also notes 150-54 infra and accompanying text.
1' See note 72 supra & note 149 infra.
" National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 691-92; Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 934-35, 549 P.2d at 842, 130 Cal. Rptr.
at 10. Professor Sullivan also recognizes the criterion of competition as the key variable under a
rule of reason analysis:
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The Supreme Court's recent refusal to accept a "worthy purpose" defense for a professional ethic barring competitive bidding by
consulting engineers clearly establishes that the rule of reason's key
concern is with the enhancement of competition. In National Society
of Professional Engineers v. United States,' the trade association
contended that their ethical ban on competitive bidding was reasonable since price competition among professional engineers would be
contrary to the public interest. According to the trade association,
competition would cause engineers to bid low with a view toward
taking economic shortcuts that would adversely affect the quality of
their work; the Society asserted that the public health, safety, and
welfare would therefore be endangered.'
In explaining the purpose
of a rule of reason analysis, the Supreme Court made clear that if
vested interest groups were dissatisfied with the quality of oversight
in an industry, policy changes are not to be made by such groups but
rather by Congress.'
Underscoring that competition is the key
criterion, the Court held that even the risk to safety was not sufficient to permit the Court to contradict congressional policy in favor of
competition.l" Accordingly, ethical or societal considerations were
deemed irrelevant under a rule of reason analysis unless these considerations were incidental to the pro-competitive or market perfecting
aims of the association. "
But it is fair to say that the dominant modern conception of the rule is infused with
that exquisite simplicity drawn from the past which indentifies impact on competition as the sole variable to be measured in applying the rule. Flexibility in the
attainment of the statutory objective is provided, but not flexibility for the courts to
choose what kind of economy we are to have. In sum, this tradition reads the rule
of reason as condemning every contract, combination or conspiracy which in purpose or likely effect will significantly restrict competition. The rule of reason is a
standard which calls on courts to judge shades and gradations of competitive impact, a difficult enough inquiry. But the rule does not call on a court to judge
whether a restraint of this or that precise degree is justified by its complementary
tendency toward some transcendent good.
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST § 68 (1977).
1- 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
15 id. at 693.
is Id. at 689-90.
'
Id. at 693.
'a Id. at 692; Mardirosian v. American Inst. of Architects, 474 F. Supp. 627 (D.D.C. 1979)
(irrelevant that canons of professional association serves societal goals other than enhancement
of competition if rules, in effect, limited competition among association's members). See Union
Circulation Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 241 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1957) (association's adoption of
standards to improve reputation of door-to-door magazine solicitation insufficient to justify
diminished competition among subscription firms to the advantage of entrenched agencies);
United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Ohio 1960) (trade association cannot
promote its economic beliefs through self-regulatory plan which has significant anti-competitive
impact).
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The sweeping nature of the MLS access condition bears a remarkable similarity to the justification proffered for the competitive
bidding restraint at issue in ProfessionalEngineers. Nevertheless, the
requirement that certain professional and ethical norms be satisfied
has on occasion "been justified as necessary to induce individuals in a
given business to join the association, and thus necessary to make the
association's pro-competitive goals a realistic possibility." 15 In other
words, it has been alleged that persons seeking access to the MLS
may require some assurance that the members with whom they enter
into the listing sharing agreement satisfy professional and ethical
norms so as not to endanger the business reputation of participating
1 56
brokers or subject them to liability for unlawful practices.
An empirical analysis of the justification for conditioning MLS
access on Realtor board membership, however, reveals that this position is untenable. The Antitrust Section of the Division of Criminal
Justice within the State of New Jersey's Department of Law and Public Safety has been conducting an empirical analysis of complaints
filed with the New Jersey Real Estate Commission (REC) focusing on
the year 1977. The empirical analysis was designed to determine

Also noted in the ProfessionalEngineers decision was the overbroad nature of the restraint.
The ethical canon applied no matter how simple and repetitive the work or how expert the
parties involved in a project might be. 435 U.S. at 692. Similarly, no matter how flawless in
terms of ethical behavior a broker or salesperson seeking MLS access might be, the sweeping
nature of the restraint of conditioning MLS access on Realtor Board membership precludes a
nonmember from MLS participation unless the condition precedent is satisfied. For further
analysis of the effect of less restrictive alternatives under a rule of reason analysis, see notes
161-89 infra and accompanying text.
...United States v. Realty Multi-List Inc., [1980] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,624, at
77,313 (5th Cir. 1980). See E.A. McGuade Tours, Inc. v. Consolidated Air Tour Manual
Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 188 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973).
" United States v. Realty Multi-List Inc., [1980] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,624, at
77,313 (5th Cir. 1980). The court in Realty Multi-List noted, however, that where a state extensively regulates the real estate industry, the additional requirements imposed by the MLS are
often unnecessary. The court concluded that:
when a multiple listing service seeks to establish the reasonable necessity of membership criteria regulating areas already covered by state regulation, it must make a
showing either that the legitimate needs of the service require protection in excess
of that provided by the state or that the state does not adequately enforce its own
regulations.
Id. at 77,317 (footnote omitted).
Also, it must be re-emphasized that where such alleged improvements in professional performance and ethical behavior cannot be empirically substantiated, such hyberbole must be
afforded little, if any, evidentiary weight. Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that the empirical evidence submitted must demonstrate that the restraint imposed is necessarily ancillary to
the market perfecting goals of the MLS. As stated by the Supreme Court in Continental T.V. v.
G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 53 n.21 (1979), "an antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks." Id.
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whether services which predicate MLS access upon Realtor board
membership (Board MLS) generate fewer complaints than those
which do not condition MLS access on Realtor membership (Inde5
pendent MLS). 1
'5' There were 29 Board MLS" and 10 Independent MLS' in existence in New Jersey in 1977.
The research was conducted approximately from May 1979 through October 1979 for the time
period of calendar year 1977. Such research was in line with the scope of the State's overall
investigation into anti-competitive practices in the real estate industry in New Jersey. A total of
1,236 complaints were on file with the State REC for 1977.
From the total, 798 files were removed for numerous reasons:
-many files involved rentals;
-the complainee did not belong to any MLS;
-the file dealt with an inquiry, not a complaint;
-many complaints involved tenant/landlord disputes;
-numerous complaints involved builder/buyer disputes on new homes;
-124 files are still open or are in process with a Real Estate Commission investigator
assigned to the case.
For the remaining 438 complaints, phone numbers and addresses were obtained and
attempts were made to contact these complainees to determine whether they were members of
a multiple listing service in 1977 and, if so, with which type of MLS they did most of their
business-Board or Independent MLS. It could therefore be determined what type of MLS
was involved in the complaint. From the nature of the complaint as supplied by the REC
investigator the complaints were broken down into the following categories: commission disputes, return of deposit disputes, release from listing disputes, misrepresentations, fraud, unethical conduct, and incompetency. The last four categories were then collapsed into an overall
category of conduct labelled as "offensive to the consumer." Frequently, research is undertaken
in which one is interested in the number of objects, items or characteristics which fall into
various categories. The researcher may wish to compare a distribution of observed frequencies
with a theoretical distribution generated on the basis of some hypothesis which is independent
of the data at hand. If there is a category and the expected number, this gives evidence for the
rejection of the hypothesis which gave rise to the theoretical frequencies. Using the following
formula

X

2

k
=

(o i - e;)2

i=1Ei
the Chi-square is calculated by finding the difference between the observed frequencies (0i)
and the expected frequencies (El) for that category. Finally, sum across all categories. For an
explanation of and the rationale behind Chi-square, see S. SIECEL, NON-PARAMETRIC STATISTICS
(1956).
Sampling was not necessary to the Antitrust Section's research since the entire population
of complaints filed with the REC in 1977 was examined; however, the following illustration is
helpful in understanding how the sampling technique is integrated into the Chi-square formula.
First, assume that the complaints filed with the REC are broken down into three categories:
misrepresentation, unethical conduct, and incompetency and that the total number of relevant
complaints is 5000. A sample of 20% would produce a sample size of 1000 complaints. Furthermore, assume that Realtor Board MLS' account for 60% of all residential dollar sales volume
that passed through all MLS' in the state in a given year and that Independent MLS' account
for the remaining 40% of residential dollar sales volume. It follows then that one would expect
the percentage breakdown of complaints emanating out of Board MLS' to be far less than 60%
and far greater than 40% for Independent MLS'. Because of the requirement that Realtors are

427

MLS AND THE RULE OF REASON

1981]

The statistical approach employed was frequency tabulation
which used MLS dollar volume sales as the control variable. The concept or rationale underlying the non-parametric statistical technique
of Chi-square was applied in that Chi-square suggests a methodology
by which one is able to compare an observed with an expected group
of frequencies. '
Since Board MLS' claim that their Realtors adhere to a higher
code of ethics, one would expect that board members would demonstrate superior ethical behavior, competence, and knowledge when
compared with an Independent MLS. As noted in Exhibit 1, Board
MLS' accounted for 74.7% of the total residential real estate dollar
volume as compared to 25.3% for Independent MLS'. It follows conceptually then, according to the Chi-square rationale, that one would
expect the percentage breakdown of complaints emanating out of
Board MLS' to be far less than 74.7% and far greater than 25.3% for
Independent MLS'.
supposed to adhere to a Code of Ethics, one would expect superior performance in terms of
competence, honesty and ethics from Realtors associated with Board MLS' vis-b-vis Independent MLS'.
The effect of Realtor Board MLS status vis-h-vis Independent MLS status can be tested by
analyzing the results of complaints filed emanating out of Board MLS' compared with complaints emanating out of Independent MLS' for a given time period. The null hypothesis can be
stated accordingly: There is no statistically significant difference in the expected number of
complaints filed emanating out of Board MLS' v. Independent MLS' and any observed difference is merely a chance variation to be expected in a sample from the population. Since we are
comparing the data from one sample with a presumed population, a one-sample test is appropriate. Chi-square is particularly appropriate because the hypothesis under consideration concerns
a comparison of observed and expected frequencies in discrete categories. Fitting the Chisquare formula to the illustrative data might show the following results:
OBSERVED COMPLAINTS
Categories of
Conduct

I
II
Realtor Bd. Independent

I11
Totals

EXPECTED COMPLAINTS

Realtor Bd.
Col. Inl
x 60%

Indep.
Col. III
x 40%

Misrepresentation
Ethics
Incompetency

200
200
300

100
100
100

300
300
400

180
180
240

120
120
160

Total

700

300

1000

600

400

With a 99% confidence level and two degrees of freedom, the calculated Chi-square of 13.3
is greater than the 9.21 Chi-square found in a table for Chi-square distribution indicating that
there is a statistically significant difference between Board MLS' and Independent MLS' in
terms of ethics, honesty and competency. In other words one could say there is only a 1%
chance that one would not be wrong in concluding that Board MLS' are not superior to Independent MLS' in terms of ethics, competence and honesty, given the above distribution of data.
158 W.

(1978).

MENDENHALL

& G.

REINMUTH,

STATISTICS

FOR

MANAGEMENT AND ECONOMICS

634-36
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EXHIBIT 1
ANALYSIS OF TOTAL DOLLAR SALES VOLUME FOR
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY SOLD THROUGH BOARD
RELATED AND ALSO INDEPENDENT MLS'
CALENDAR YEAR 1977
RECAP

TOTALS
LESS NON-RESIDENTIAL
NET RESIDENTIAL

DOLLAR
VOLUME

%

$2,916,558,558
87,724,704
$2,828,863,854

100.0

$2,113,587,039
715,276,815

74.7
25.3

$2,828,863,854

100.0

BY:
BOARD MLS
INDEPENDENT MLS

SOURCE: Civil Investigative Demands served upon Board and Independent MLS' in New Jersey, June-August 1979.

The data in Exhibit 2, however, reveal that in only two of the
seven complaint categories do Board MLS' exhibit the expected direction whereas in five of the seven categories what is observed is
markedly different from what is expected if adherence to some Code
of Ethics is supposed to result in superior performance by Board
MLS'. More importantly, the two complaint categories where Board
MLS' data observations match expected frequencies, release from listing and commission disputes, are not issues as crucial to consumers
as are unethical conduct, incompetency, misrepresentation, and
fraud. This is clearly established when these four cells are collapsed
into an "offensive to consumer" category: 1' Board MLS' then account
for 80% of the complaints which can be characterized as offensive to
the consumer which were filed with the New Jersey Real Estate
Commission in 1977. This is far greater than their proportionate
74.7% share of residential real estate volume. Thus, it is reasonable
to conclude that there is little, if any, correlation between Realtor
board membership and exemplary professional behavior.- °

See note 157 supra.
A word is in order concerning the value of empirical documentation in general and the use
of complaints filed in particular in antitrust cases. In past cases dealing with the access issue in
'

'6
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EXHIBIT 2
1,236
798
438

TOTAL OF COMPLAINTS
TOTAL REMOVED
TOTAL OF COMPLAINTS USED
LIST OF COMPLAINT CATEGORIES

UNETHICAL
INCOMPETENCY
MISREPRESENTATION
FRAUD
RELEASE FROM LISTING
COMMISSION DISPUTE
REFUND OF DEPOSIT

TOTALS

BOARD
TOTAL NUMBER
72
92
45
57
64
77
3
3

INDEPENDENT

%

NUNfBER

%

78
79
83
100

20
12
13
0

22
21
17
100

229
13

184
8

80
62

45
5

20
38

94
102

68
81

72
79

26
21

28
21

209

157

75

52

25

438

341

78

97

general, much testimony was theoretical rather than empirical. Evidence tended to appear in
the form of a qualitative assessment without the benefit of empirical support. The trend, however, is away from unsubstantiated opinion and toward empirical analysis. Heiss & LoCascio,
Computers Can Aid Litigation, 2 NAT'L L.J. 29 (Oct. 8, 1979). The rule of reason permits proof
of assertions concerning competitive impact by meaningful evidence rather than verbal ritual.
Empirical analysis, or its absence, in a rule of reason case is consequential.
For example, in a case where user endorsements were employed in an attempt to substantiate claims of effectiveness for a product, a petitioner produced empirical evidence to demonstrate that there was no benefit associated with the product. Citing Vacu-Matic Carburator
Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 157 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1946), the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) held that empirical analysis overrides any reliance on user testimonials. Brown Auto
Stabilizer Co., [1973-2] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,150 (FTC Dkt. 8863) (5th Cir. 1972). See
also Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 954 (1971) (court observed that statistics often demonstrate more than testimony of many
witnesses).
Unsubstantiated allegations were also tested in Oates, where the defendant tried to justify
non-access to its MLS with the "business reason" of "administrative convenience" wherein one
of the defendant's officers opined that a membership number of "somewheres around 40" was
ideal. 113 N.J. Super. at 392, 273 A.2d at 806. The Oates court determined that
[o]ther than this naked opinion . . . there is no support in the record which demonstrates that the limitation in number of members is necessary or even
It may be that there ought to be some limitation in numbers with
beneficial ....
respect to the proper administration of a multiple listing service. But there is no
proof in this record to establish any such standard.
id. at 393, 273 A.2d at 806-07 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Palsson the defendant Realtor
board's claim that a non-access restraint on part-time licensed real estate sales agents furthered
professional competence was rejected. The California Supreme Court noted that the Marin
County Board of Realtors failed to establish that the restraint facilitated an increase in profes-
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As part and parcel of the Realtor Code of Ethics, Realtors imply,
if not attempt to induce reliance on the part of consumers, that they
sional competence in all or even most cases. The court concluded that the MLS non-access rule
of the Board was too broadly drawn in light of its anti-competitive effects. 16 Cal. 3d at 939-40,
549 P.2d at 845, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
In Group Health Corp. v. King County Medical Soc'y, 39 Wash. 2d 586, 614, 237 P.2d
737, 748-54 (1951), the court noted the absence of any evidence to support the defendant
medical society's claim that the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) provided substandard
services and found that the society had acted in restraint of trade by excluding HMO doctors.
Similarly, the court in Boddicker v. Arizona State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977), determined that unless the Dental Association could show benefit
to the public in the form of improved service which resulted from its condition requiring dentists to be members of the American Dental Association in order to gain membership in the
Arizona Dental Association, the professional group would be in violation of the Sherman Act.
It is clear from the above that empirical analysis has a place in complex antitrust litigation.
More specifically, exclusionary conduct in a real estate context under the guise of a Code of
Ethics can make use of complaints filed associated with practitioner segments as an appropriate
input for rule of reason analysis.
For example, in a nationwide study of the number and significance of price-fixing conspiracies, Professor John Kuhlman developed data taken from indictments and complaints issued by
the Department of Justice during the period from 1965 to 1969. According to Dr. Kuhlman, the
complaints filed reflected evidence of an association between anti-competitive conduct and industry characteristics. Kuhlman, Nature and Significance and Price-FixingRings, 2 ANTITRUST
L. & ECON. REV. 74 (Spring 1969). In a study of illegal corporate behavior conducted by Marshall Clinard, an expert on white-collar crime, under the auspices of the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration, law enforcement actions brought by 24 federal agencies against 582
corporations during 1975 and 1976 were examined. The focus of the study was whether a company had any kind of action filed against it. Repetitive Government Enforcers, 943 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) at A-9, 10 (Dec. 13, 1979).
In United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565 (N. D.
II1. 1975), the USDI, a private educational facility offering graduate courses in orthodontia to
practicing dentists, alleged that the defendant trade association had engaged in a group boycott
by refusing to recognize its programs in order to preserve the AAO monopoly in the practice of
orthodontia. The trade association responded to these charges by contending that its actions
were designed to protect dentists from the substandard education provided by USDI. The court
found that the activities described should not be exempted from Sherman Act compliance and
denied the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 396 F. Supp. at 581.
In analyzing the USDI case Mr. Dickey suggests that in order for the AAO to win on the
merits, they would have to prove that the courses offered by the USDI were in fact inadequate
when compared with the generally established standards of the orthodontic profession. Mr.
Dickey opines that the AAO should have substantiated its claim by introducing correspondence
referring to USDI and by listing complaints filed against the Institute. Dickey, The Professions
and Noncommercial Purposes: Applicability of Per Se Rules Under the Sherman Act, 11 J. L.
REF. 403 (1978).
Finally, from a marketing perspective, studies of consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction with
services have dealt largely with describing the frequency of complaints about various types of
services. Bearden, Durand, Mason, & Teel, Dimensions of Consumer Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Services: The Case of Electrical Utilities, 6 J. ACAD. MARKETING SCIENCE 278 (Fall
1978). In a speech before the American Marketing Association, Robert Reich, Director, Office
of Policy Planning, FTC, stated that consumer complaints are one of the most important business assets available. They serve as early warning devices and should play a prominent role in
terms of marketing strategy. U.S. Firms, FTC Should Work Together to Market Good Products,
MARKETING NEWS 1, 7 (July 11, 1980).
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are superior in terms of the price/quality relationship compared to
non-Realtor licensees. This logic is carried forth to suggest that absent the Board membership requirement, an insufficient number of
Realtors would be willing to participate in an MLS in order to effectively serve the pro-competitive goals of a service for the pooling of
listings. Yet if a Board MLS seeks to justify its Realtor Board membership criterion as a necessary condition to serve its pro-competitive
purpose, it is only reasonable to require that the proponents of the
MLS access restrictions empirically substantiate the factual basis for
those restrictions. As the above analysis reveals, the proponents' conclusory allegations do not reflect an accurate picture of consumer
complaints and perceptions.
F. Less Restrictive Alternatives
Among the elements to be considered in the examination of the
reasonableness of the restraint imposed is whether other less restrictive means could be employed to achieve the same desired ends. 6 '
Courts are entitled to consider evidence of the existence of viable
alternatives to conditioning MLS access upon Realtor Board membership to achieve such objectives as upgrading professional development and preventing fraud and deception. For example, in Murphy
Tugboat v. Shipowners & Merchants Towboat,"'2 the defendants had
a policy of not working on towing jobs with competitors. The defendants claimed "that this policy was a reasonable measure to assure that
jobs would be performed safely and competently and to minimize
their exposure to claims and litigation." " The court held that the
jury was entitled to weigh this alleged justification against the evidence that neither the defendants' own operations in other markets
nor other firms followed such a policy."1' Similarly, the existence of
MLS' which do not condition access upon Realtor Board membership
provides a viable, less restrictive alternative to those proponents who
claim that MLS' can only operate effectively under Realtor Board
domination. "
As noted in the previous section, if Realtors truly believe that
licensing standards are too low, resulting in unethical or incompetent
"' Paralegal Inst., Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 475 F. Supp. 1123, 1129 (E.D.N.Y. 1979)

(quoting Hennessey v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 564 F.2d 1136, 1153 (5th Cir. 1977));
Allison, Ambiguous Price-Fixing and the Sherman Act: Simplistic Labels or Unavoidable Analysis?, 16 Hous. L. REV. 769-70 (1979).
l' 467 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
Id. at 850.

Id.

164

"i See notes 212-13 infra and accompanying text.
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practitioners, their awesome lobbying power and vast financial resources could be directed toward upgrading licensing and entry
requirements." The MLS itself could establish programs for professional development and supervision of practitioner behavior without
the additional onus of Realtor membership which apparently results
in nothing more than an increased cost of doing business to licensed
brokers and salespersons. The MLS may impose reasonable rules for
the operation of the service, including rules concerning ethics and
arbitration procedures insofar as such procedures apply to MLS transactions.
Realtor trade promotion provides a marketplace basis for a less
restrictive alternative to conditioning MLS access on Board membership. Realtors assert that the MLS access condition protects
homeowners who seek to deal only with highly qualified professionals
such as Realtors. Since at least 1978 Realtors have claimed that the
public has come to associate competency, fairness, and high integrity
in business relations with Realtors. 6 7 Since such a claim, related to
the most significant transaction that the vast majority of consumers
will ever make, is the kind of a claim that a consumer would materially rely on, it would logically have to follow that he would
voluntarily choose a Realtor over a non-Realtor practitioner, thereby
obviating the need for the more restrictive MLS access condition barring all brokers and salespersons who refuse to comply with trade
association membership.
Also, there are certain traditional and well developed alternatives
to protect consumers in real estate transactions. Agency law provides
a remedy for a principal when the broker's conduct breaches his duty
as agent to his client. Tort law offers a remedy to any person suffering damage as a result of wrongful conduct or omission by a broker.
These legal remedies serve to minimize any risks in dealing with a
non-Realtor broker. 168
When entry into a trade or practice is publicly regulated and
criteria for licensure are established by law, the burden of justifying
additional self-regulation based on subjective impressions of integrity,
ethical conduct, or private notions of competency increases. 16 ' The
" See notes 135-40 supra and accompanying text.
" Realtor Review, July, 1978 at 24 (Comment of Harlan Williams, Chairman of Professional
Standards Committee of NAR).
"6 Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice Doctrine, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 767 (1978).
16 Austin, Real Estate Boards and Multiple Listing Systems as Restraints of Trade, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1349 (1970). In United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., [1980] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH)
63,624 at 77,317 (5th Cir. 1980), the court addressed the effect of state
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New Jersey REC is a regulatory agency and instrument of the State
of New Jersey within the Department of Insurance. Among the
duties and responsibilities of the REC is the licensing of real estate
applicants. By precluding brokers and licensed salespersons from the
multiple listing service unless they become members of a board of
Realtors, a private trade association, in effect, preempts the Real
Estate Commission's duties and responsibilities in regard to who
practices real estate, thereby precluding qualified licensees from a
substantial share of the market. The Real Estate License Act is designed to protect the public from fraud, incompetence, misrepresentation, and unconscionable practice. 7 ' The pre-eminence of state
regulation in the real estate industry has been recognized by the
courts.'' In fact, Realtors themselves are on record in acknowledging the competency of the State REC.' 72 Since Realtors acknowledge
the valuable and effective role of state real estate commissions in
policing the conduct of brokers and salespersons, there would appear
to be no need for the more restrictive MLS access condition.
Another area of contention with respect to the less restrictive
alternative element of the rule of reason standard arises under the
proposition that those seeking MLS access without Board membership can simply start their own MLS. Conversely, Realtors argue
that they have an absolute right of association and do not have to

regulation of areas sought to be governed by trade association requirements as a precondition to
access to a multiple listing service, concluding as follows:
When a multiple listing service seeks to establish the reasonable necessity of membership criteria regulating areas already generally covered by state regulation, it
must make a showing either that the legitimate needs of the service require protection in excess of that provided by the state or that the state does not automatically
enforce its own regulation.
Id. (footnote omitted).
.o Zaid v. Island House Condominium Ass'n, 197 N.J. Super. 206, 209-10, 406 A.2d 196, 198
(Ch. Div. 1979); Boise Cascade Homes v. New Jersey Real Estate Div., 121 N.J. Super. 228,
240, 296 A.2d 545, 551 (Ch. Div. 1972).
17' Grillo, 91 N.J. Super. at 212, 219 A.2d at 640; Collins, 452 Pa. at 351, 304 A.2d at 497.
' Mr. Charles Cavanaugh, First Vice-President of the New Jersey Association of Realtors,
appearing before a public hearing on possible changes in structure and administration of the
New Jersey REC had this to say about the effectiveness of the present regulatory system:
the existing system has worked well since its inception in 1921 and should not be
changed 'for change sake' . . . only those individuals of the highest reputation and
integrity on a bipartisan basis have been named to the [N.J.] real estate commission
....
The voices of the well intended but misguided individuals who feel the [N.J.]
real estate commission must conform to their perception of what a regulatory body
is should be made to cite specifics where the existing structure has not carried out
the Legislature's mandate. We oppose the interjection of a new concept which cannot assure an improvement in the existing system and a benefit to the general
public.
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make their assets available to anyone who rejects the tripartite trade
association package as a condition for access to benefits and services
offered by the Board.
In regard to the first contention, an MLS is nothing more than
an inventory or central clearinghouse that brokers use to compile and
disseminate home listings and offerings to the public. In theory, an
MLS can reduce market imperfections and lower the cost of the
home purchase to the consumer by expanding the size of the market
in which any one broker operates. As a result, the homeowner's
property is brought to the attention of all members of an MLS and all
listings in the MLS become available to prospective purchasers.
From an economic perspective, such clearinghouses or data banks are
analogous to natural monopolies with concomitant advantages and
efficiencies. "'
Hence, it would appear that the MLS is a rational way to bring
order to a fragmented, atomistic marketplace. In practice, however,
each MLS operates in a separate geographic jurisdiction, chartered
by the national trade association. The splintering of MLS' or additional MLS' in the same trade area would therefore defeat the very purpose and rationale behind the MLS concept, namely, the largest
possible pooling of residential inventory to achieve efficiency and
economies of scale.
It is also very questionable whether practitioners seek or even
recognize any benefits or services offered by Realtor boards, at least
to the same degree as the acknowledged acceptance of the MLS as
the sine qua non of practicing real estate.171 One would usually
associate benefits to the public with confidence in the industry on the
5
part of the public. But studies of the industry suggest otherwise.1

Zarate, Realtors Assail Plan to Change the Rules, Newark Star-Ledger, Dec. 19, 1979, at 15.
173 See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 369-70 (1973); United States v.
Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 397 (1912); Trombetta, Using Antitrust Law to Control
Anticompetitive Real Estate Industry Practices, 14 J. CONSUMER AFF. 142, 143 (Summer 1980).
t1 Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 938, 540 P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12. The Palsson court stated
that
[wihile the Marin County Board .. .may permissibly provide some exclusive benefits to its members, access to the MLS is so essential to nonmembers if they are to
compete effectively that such access must be granted to all licensed salesmen and
brokers who choose to use the service.
Id. See also Oates, 91 N.J. Super. at 222-23, 219 A.2d at 646.
"nHomeowners and purchasers "have little brand loyalty when it comes to choosing among
the country's 125,000 realty brokers." Painless Moving, SALES & MARKET MANACEMENT, July 9,
1979 at 9. A low index of brand loyalty reflects dissatisfaction with practice in the industry, not
gratitude for benefits received. In a recent survey conducted by the Long Beach, California real
estate firm of Coast Equities, respondents ranked real estate agents next to last on a scale
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As far as services offered by Realtor boards that are claimed to
benefit the public, arbitration and grievance procedures deal
overwhelmingly with commission disputes between Realtors. The
statewide investigation conducted by the New Jersey Antitrust Section of the Division of Criminal Justice discovered that a consumer
complaining against Realtors through Realtor Board grievance and
arbitration mechanisms is a rare phenomenon. In New Jersey, there
are no non-Realtor practitioners or laymen that participate in these
mechanisms.
Realtor seminars and their impact on the public interest are debatable. As seminars in general proliferate, so do complaints increase
about the number of "shoddy, worthless presentations.""' As the
number of those who enroll in workshops and seminars increases, so
do questions about what one gets for his money. 7 Even where
seminars and education programs are mandatorily required for professional relicensing, their rigor and effectiveness have been called
into question. For example, where doctors are subject to state legislation requiring continuing medical education, some states allow credit
for classes in "dating and mating," office management and estate
planning. Ohio gives credit for reading medical journals or appearing
on television shows. California has only recently begun to crack down
on such frivolous courses.'
Empirical substantiation measuring the effectiveness of Realtors
who take such programs vis-6?-vis Realtors or non-Realtors who serve
the public without participating in them might be gleaned from
objective data. For example, indicators might be consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction, or more objective measures such as lower commission, degree of variance between asking price and receiving price
on a home, and length of time the home is on the market.'79

measuring professional ethics-only car dealers received a lower score. Hill, Bargain
Brokers-As Home Prices Rise, More Sellers Are Using Reduced-Rate Agents, Wall St.J., June
26, 1979, at 32, col. 3. In a poll conducted by the California REC in 1977, "only one-fourth of
the home buyers interviewed and one-third of the sellers described their brokers as 'honest.'
Id.
" Rout, More Courses Provoke Gripes as High Profits Draw in Promoters, Wall St.J., Dec.
27, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
'" Hymowitz, Sisterhood Inc.-Business is Booming For Those Who Help Women in Business, Wall St.J., Aug. 31, 1979, at 1, col. 1.
"I' Few Doctors Suffer Under Burgeoning State Relicensing Laws, Wall St.J., Apr. 29, 1980,
at 1.
'" See, e.g., Muris & McChesney, Advertising and the Price and Quality of Legal Services:
The Case For Legal Clinics, 1979 AM. B. RESEARCH FOUNDATION J. 179-207 (authors compared
legal clinics to traditional law firms using similar criteria as measures of performance).
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Finally, in regard to the last contention that private trade associations have an absolute right to bar nonmembers from their benefits
and services, the courts have long recognized that the rights of association are not absolute. A private trade association does not have an
unqualified right to select its members or to deny nonmembers its
benefits: "Antitrust principles have been applied to prevent trade
associations from excluding certain individuals from membership and
from precluding non-members from participation in association activities when the effect would have been to deprive the non-members of
a competitive advantage.""85 A trade association may not hoard a significant competitive benefit for a select group in an industry for whatever reason, without subjecting itself to antitrust scrutiny. 18 1 "Not
only must an association open its membership to all competitors in
the covered industry, in many cases it must also make association
services available to competitors who are not members." "'2 For example, in Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United
States,"" a trade association gathered data on past transactions, among
other valuable services; these data were given wide publicity, a fact
which the Supreme Court considered highly significant.8 " Thus, by
making this service available to all who might need it to compete
effectively-buyers, sellers, members and nonmembers-the association was able to avoid Sherman Act liability.
Similar to the position taken by proponents of the Realtor board
membership precondition to MLS access, the defendants in
Associated Press v. United States " argued that their anti-competitive
restraint was beyond the prohibition of the Sherman Act because an
association has the right to choose its members
and can, as to that which he has produced by his own enterprise
and sagacity, efforts or ingenuity, decide for himself whether and
to whom to sell or not to sell ....
The Sherman Act was specifically intended to prohibit independent businesses from becoming
"associates" in a common plan which is bound to reduce their com-

petitor's opportunity to buy or sell the things in which the groups

"8 Bodner, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership and Participation:Recent
Developments, 24 N.Y.L. SCn. L. REV. 907 (1979). See also Palsson, 16 Cal. 3d at 938, 540
P.2d at 844, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 12.
" Bodner, Antitrust Restrictions on Trade Association Membership and Participation,54
A.B.A.J. 30 (1968); Kaechele, Exclusion from Real Estate Multiple Listing Services as Antitrust
Violations, 14 CAL. W. L. REV. 310 (1978).
is M. MACARTHUR, ASSOCIATIONS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 36-37 (1976).
"
268 U.S. 563 (1912).
"1

Id. at 573.

'-

326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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compete. Victory of a member of such a combination over its business rivals achieved by such collective means cannot consistently
with the Sherman Act or with practical, everyday knowledge be
attributed to individual "enterprise and sagacity;" such hampering
of business rivals can only be attributed to that which really makes
it possible-the collective power of an unlawful combination."
It takes little "enterprise," "sagacity," or "ingenuity" to lock up listings in what is essentially nothing more than a clearinghouse mechanism. The MLS access condition locks up those things in which the
groups compete- listings. It is at least arguable that "enterprise,"
"sagacity" and "ingenuity" would be better reflected in superior
management, finance, and marketing rather than a blanket non-access
rule that monopolizes not those things that work toward the consumer interest but the basic goods (listings) that provide the ingredients for competition to take place.
The federal policy toward access to significant trade association
benefits would appear to be contrary to the MLS access condition. In
an address in Washington, D.C. in 1979, Mr. Richard Favretto, Deputy Director of Operations, Antitrust Division, emphasized that access to significant business advantages flowing from trade association
membership is a crucial concern of the Division. By making access to
key association services available to non-association members, a trade
association is likely to avoid any antitrust problems flowing from
87
membership restrictions. 1
The New Jersey Real Estate Commission's position on conditioning MLS access on Realtor membership would seem to be in harmony with the federal Antitrust Division's views. In the mid-1970's,
Century 21, the largest real estate franchise company in the country,
tried to limit membership to Realtors only; however, the REC required that franchises be made available to anyone with a real estate
license. The Commission considered the "Realtor only" provision to
be discriminatory." s Consequently, given that MLS' are much more
dominant than any realty franchise company, requiring Realtor membership as a condition for MLS access should logically be anathema to
the State Real Estate Commission.
As one commentator recognized long ago in placing trade association benefits and services in their proper perspective:

"1

Id. at 13-15.

...
377

ANTITUST

&

TRADE REC.

REP. (BNA) 9 (Mar. 20, 1979).

11 Rescigno, Century 21 Wins Clearance to Do Business in New Jersey, Bergen Record, Jan.
24, 1975, § B, at 16.
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It [the trade association] does not order, it advises. It does not

coerce, it persuades. It does not issue mandates or even instructions. It uses only the moving eloquence of a reasoned appeal to
the self-interest of its members. It does not tell its members what
they must do. It tells them what, if influenced by a decent regard
for their own interest, they will be glad to do.'89
IV. POMANOWSKI v. MONMOUTH COUNTY BOARD OF
REALTORS 190
The Pomanowski case was a recent New Jersey decision in which
the anti-competitiveness of conditioning MLS access on Realtor Board
membership was assessed.' 9 ' The case is significant in that it addresses many of the issues raised in this article. In particular, the
court examined the relevant market question in detail and devoted
extensive treatment to a rule of reason analysis of the restraint imposed on MLS access.
In Pomanowski the plaintiff, a licensed real estate broker in New
Jersey, had been a member of the Monmouth County Board of Realtors (MCBR) as well as its MLS since 1972.'9' Due to a basic disagreement with the policies and practices of the board,5 he decided
to terminate his board membership by failing to pay the 1977 dues
for himself and his salespersons.1 4 At the same time, however,
Pomanowski sought to continue his participation in the MLS, chal189 T. MEADE,

11

LAWFUL RESTRAINT OF TRADE THROUGH EDUCATION, THE ANALYST

252 (1929).

175 N.J. Super. 212, 417 A.2d 1119 (Ch. Div. 1980).

191 Pomanowski originally brought suit in 1977 pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-1 (West

Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) against the defendants Monmouth County Board of Realtors and the
Monmouth County Multiple Listing Service. Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 152 N.J. Super. 100, 377 A.2d 791 (Ch. Div. 1977). The defendants moved for summary
judgment. After considering the pleadings, affidavits, briefs, exhibits and oral arguments, the
court granted judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants appealed. Pomanowski v. Monmouth County Bd. of Realtors, 166 N.J. Super. 269, 399 A.2d 990 (App. Div. 1979). The
appellate division, while agreeing with the trial court's decision as to the proper standard for
review, remanded the matter for a plenary hearing. Id. The plaintiff filed a petition for certification to the New Jersey supreme court and the defendants filed a cross petition for certification.
The supreme court denied certification and the matter was returned to the trial court for proceedings. The trial commenced on February 20, 1980.
9
152 N.J. Super. at 104, 377 A.2d at 793.
'9
Among the reasons enumerated by Pomanowski why he no longer wished to be a member
of the board were: (1) his belief that the practices of the board were contrary to the public
interest, (2) his conviction that the Realtor Ethics Committee's decisions were made in an
arbitrary manner and tended to stifle competition, (3) the requirement that all his salespersons
had to join the tripartite trade association package. 152 N.J. Super. at 104-05, 377 A.2d at
793-94.
11 152 N.J. Super. at 104, 377 A.2d at 793. In addition to the dues payable to the MCBR,
membership dues were also assessed for the National Association of Realtors and the New
Jersey Association of Realtors. Id.
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lenging the board membership precondition under New Jersey antitrust provisions. "
To begin its analysis, the court very carefully articulated the
standard under which the rule of reason was to be applied to the
MLS access condition. The court emphasized that the objective of the
examination was to measure competitive significance and " 'not to decide whether a policy favoring competition is in the public interest,
or in the interest of the members of an industry.' "" Against this
effect on competition, the court would weigh possible justifications
for the restraints urged by the defendants.
In order to assess the effect on competition, the court first
deemed it necessary to define the relevant geographic and product
markets.'
Similar to the position taken in this article, the
Pomanowski court determined the relevant geographic market to be
5
the chartered territorial jurisdiction of the MCBR."'
Although the
MLS did process some incidental listings outside the chartered territory, this amounted to no more than 15% of the MLS's listings and
was therefore deemed insufficient to extend the boundaries of the
market. "
In addition, the court limited the relevant product market solely
to residential sales. Relying on expert testimony, the court found that
significant differences existed between the residential and nonresidential real estate markets, particularly with respect to the differing purchasing characteristics and needs of the public. 2' Moreover,
the 1978 MLS Activity Report indicated that residential listings
accounted for 90% of the total listings. 2 ' Finally, the court

' N.J, STAT. ANN. § 56:9-1 to 56:9-18 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).

175 N.J. Super. at 214, 417 A.2d at 1120 (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
'9 175 N.J. Super. at 215, 417 A.2d at 1121.
Id. See notes 110-23 supra and accompanying text.
5 175 N.J. Super. at 21-16, 417 A.2d at 1120-21. The court excluded the nine municipalities
which comprise the chartered territorial jurisdiction of the Southern Monmouth County Board
of Realtors because that board had its own MLS and the defendants "offered no proof to indicate that this area had any impact on the MCBR's territory." Id. at 215, 417 A.2d at 1121.
In addition, it is worth noting that even the Monmouth County MLS rules and regulations
recognize the chartered jurisdictional territory assigned to the board as the relevant geographic
market:
Exclusive listings of properties of the following types located within the County of
Monmouth, must be taken by participants on an exclusive right to sell form and
shall be delivered to the MLS office within 24 hours after all necessary signatures of
sellers have been obtained except as provided for in Section 1.3.
Monmouth County Multiple Listing Service Rules and Regulations § I (Jan. 1971).
175 N.J. Super. at 216, 417 A.2d at 1121. See notes 82-103 supra and accompanying text.
' 175 N.J. Super. at 216, 417 A.2d at 1121.
'1
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determined that "intra-firm" sales (property sold by the listing brokers) should be included in determining the market share of the MLS.
The court stated that although "such property was sold by the listing
broker, it was nevertheless multiple listed and, as such, available to
other brokers. It [was] the fact of listing and sale of residential property through MLS" 20 1 that the court found significant.
Employing the definition of the relevant market, the court concluded that the Monmouth County MLS commanded a minimum fifty percent share of the market. 2 ' Furthermore, the court calculated
that 84% of the brokers within this relevant market were MLS
members.The meaning of this percentage is that a licensed salesperson or broker would be precluded from 84% of the firms in Monmouth County if he chose not to join the board and thus be denied
access to a substantial number of listings.s5 In light of these factors,
the court viewed the impact of the Monmouth County MLS on the
market as substantial. 20 6
Id.
Id. at 217, 417 A.2d at 1121. Statistics indicated that in 1977 the dollar volume of residential sales totaled $319 million. Of this total, $223 million represented sales of MLS listed property, or 70% of the Monmouth County residential property market. This percentage figure was
reduced by the dollar value of "non-usables" in categories where brokers may participate, the
latter dollar value figure was added to the denominator for all residential sales in the assigned
territorial jurisdiction of the MCMLS. "Non-usables" are 27 categories of real estate transactions
that are not used in determining assessment-sales ratios pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:1-35.1
(West 1960); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 18:12-1 (1979). With relevant non-usable categories added to
the 1977 denominator of $319 million, the new figure becomes $376 million for the denominator; factoring out 15% of the $223 million numerator for 1977 to account for properties listed
in the MCMLS outside the board's chartered territorial jurisdiction, the approximate 50% figure the court used is ascertained. This 50% figure, however, may well have been understated.
If certain non-usable categories are appropriately recognized as categories of real estate transactions where brokers were very unlikely to be involved, $9 million at least can be subtracted
from the denominator, leaving $367 million. Furthermore, recognizing that a minimum 10% of
all houses are sold by the owner himself, see C. JANIK SELLING YOUR HOME: A GUIDE TO
2m

GETTING THE BEST PRICE WrrIH OR WITHOUT A BROKER

142 (1980), the denominator is reduced

to $330 million and the true minimal market control of the Monmouth County MLS approaches
60% plus.
2 The court relied upon a study conducted by the state Attorney General's office wherein
the 1978 Monmouth County Yellow Pages were used to analyze the number of brokerage firms
that were MLS members. Out of a possible 260 firms, 40 firms were immediately removed from
the analysis because they specifically advertised themselves as specialists in areas other than
residential real estate sales. Information obtained from the Bluebook of the Monmouth County
Board of Realtors revealed that 172 of the remaining firms were MLS members. After calling
the other 48 firms it was determined that an additional 14 of these were also members of the
MLS. The court relied on this analysis to establish that 84% of the residential real estate firms
in Monmouth County were MLS members. 175 N.J. Super. at 217, 417 A.2d at 1121.
1 It is significant to note that the Palsson court struck down the "primarily engaged" MLS
access restriction when the plaintiff was precluded from only 75% of the firms. Palsson, 16 Cal.
3d at 930-32, 549 P.2d at 842-44, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 10-12. See notes 45-48 supra and accompanying text.
175 N.J. Super. at 221, 417 A.2d at 1123.
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After making its findings of "substantial" control, the court examined the defendant's proferred justifications for the restraint. The
defendants urged that the MLS access condition was justified by a
"nexus" existing between the Monmouth County Board of Realtors
and the MLS.
The defendants listed numerous activities sponsored
by the board that were alleged to have an integral relationship with
the operation of the MLS. It was testified, for example, that Realtors
"volunteer countless hours to the MLS Committee and that the
Board's arbitration and grievance services provide mediation between
MLS participants and aggrieved members of the public."208 While
the court acknowledged some interrelationship among the various
board committees, it ruled that the anti-competitive effects of the
condition outweighed the importance of any purported nexus. 2The court discounted the dire consequences of lost membership
predicted by the defendants if the MLS were available to any
licensed real estate person. In the court's opinion, such a position
would indicate that the M LS is nothing more than a drawing card for
the board, reinforcing the suspicion surrounding the true motivation
behind the board's conditioning MLS access upon Realtor
membership.2l °
In fact, testimony from Robert Ferguson, Executive VicePresident of the New Jersey Association of Realtors, confirmed the
lack of criticality in the alleged board-MLS nexus. Mr. Ferguson testified to the reluctance on the part of local boards initially to accept
multiple listing; it was only after numerous campaigns were waged
stressing the benefits of such a service that it became popular.
Hence, the court did not accept the defendant's version of impending
apocalypse were the MLS to be available to all licensed real estate
agents."'
The court also relied on the testimony of Harry Gerlach, a Realtor and Executive Officer of the MLS of Northern New Jersey. Mr.
Gerlach demonstrated that an independent MLS can function efficiently although it is not part of a Realtor organization." 2 Any grievances may be addressed to the State Real Estate Commission.
Moreover, Gerlach testified that his independent organization is totally self-supporting, thus obviating the need for volunteers in addition
a Id. at 218, 417 A.2d at 1122.
Id.
w9Id.
210
21

"

at 219, 417 A.2d at 1123.
Id. at 218, 417 A.2d at 1122.
Id. at 219, 417 A.2d at 1123.
Id.
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to those participating in the service. Furthermore, Mr. Gerlach
stated that the information he acquired as a Realtor and other attributes of membership on the board had little, if any, effect on the
operation of his MLS.21 3
Another alleged justification proffered by defendants for conditioning MLS access on Realtor board membership was that by virtue of the MCBR's Code of Ethics and the educational programs provided by the local and national boards, Realtor board members
adhered to higher professional standards."' This argument was also
rejected by the court as unsupported by any evidence offered by defendants.
The court's analysis suggests numerous alternatives to the more
restrictive Realtor approach. The basic alternative is to acknowledge
that consumers will act in their own best interests if only they are
allowed a choice and that the best means to this end is to open the
clearinghouse of listings rather than to close it. If the consumer can
effectively choose between Realtors and non-Realtors in the marketplace for real estate brokerage service, nothing prevents Realtors
from offering their own assertedly superior service and contrasting it
to that of the non-Realtor competition. Realtors can still achieve their
objectives since the Realtor board would be free to require whatever
professional standards and criteria it wishes of its truly voluntary
members including the development of "committees on arbitration,
education, or affirmative action." 215
Virtually all of the testimony presented by the defendants in
Pomanowski took the form of unsupported conclusions and selfserving opinions with no analytical support." 6 It is apparent that this
may have considerably diminished the strength of the defendants'
case. The total absence of any research on the need to impose the
MLS access condition raises suspicion about the true motive of the
defendants. Business decisions are made after detailed market
213

Id.

Id. at 219-20, 417 A.2d at 1123.
Id. at 219, 417 A.2d at 1122.
216 For example, in arguing that the Realtor Code of Ethics and the numerous educational
114

215

programs provided by Realtor boards benefit consumers who deal with Realtor board MLS', the
court referred to Palsson where the California Supreme Court rejected this alleged justification,
noting that the Realtor board defendant had failed to demonstrate any increase in professional
or ethical competence. 175 N.J. Super. at 220, 417 A.2d at 1123. See notes 50-52 supra and
accompanying text. Similarly, the Pomanowski court emphasized that the defendants had no
data to support their contention that the public readily associates the Realtor trademark with
"knowledgeable, efficient and honest handling of real estate transactions." 175 N.J. Super. at
220, 417 A.2d at 1123. There was nothing in the record to suggest that non-Realtors do not
adhere to the same principles espoused by the Realtor Code of Ethics.
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analysis so that the ramifications of a given course of conduct can be
carefully considered." 7 The inexplicable failure to allow MLS access
to brokers and salespersons with spotless records without the burden
of board membership, combined with the fact that no applicant was
ever rejected for board membership as long as he was willing to pay
dues to three different trade associations and subject himself to nonresident Realtor status, raise at the very least a strong inference that
the true motive behind the MLS access condition is to restrain trade.
V. CONCLUSION
When Realtor boards restrict MLS access to only those licensees
who agree to accept board membership a private trade association, in
effect, decides who and under what conditions real estate brokerage
will be practiced. To gain access to an MLS, it should be sufficient
that a licensee has fulfilled all state requirements. To join a private
trade association, the group may well set additional critiera. A licensee, however, should not have to bear the additional burden of having to conform to a private group's particular notion of a code of
ethics in order to participate in what is nothing more than a centralized clearinghouse for listings which, nonetheless, is necessary for
him to compete effectively.
Realtor boards and MLS' should be treated as any trade association. They should be given the benefit of the doubt since much of
what they provide may benefit both consumers and the real estate
industry and because the restraints used are not necessarily set to
drive anyone out of business. Nevertheless, such associations may
carry to excess their concerns for internal control, qualifications, and
overzealous efforts at professionalization. When they do, they expose
themselves to anti-trust liability.
The overriding objective of the antitrust law's confrontation with
Realtors on MLS non-access is to change a private trademark group
from being a virtual total arbiter of the features of the structure, delivery, and access system for buying and selling homes, into mere
advocates whose point of view must compete with others in the "marketplace of ideas" as well as the economic marketplace. As Justice
Holmes put it, "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought
A market
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."'
structure wherein non-Realtors can compete effectively against
217 United States v. United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. 422, 445-46 (1976).
2Is

Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Realtors would provide a greater variety of brokerage services to the
consumer. Consumers dissatisfied with one group could choose
brokers from the other. The right and ability to choose not to join a
private trade association can be an effective limitation on its power.
As the GriUo court observed:
It has been recognized that effective or workable competition requires the presence in the market of several sellers, each of them
possessing the capacity to survive and grow, and the preservation
of conditions which keep alive the threat of potential competition
from others."'9
Realtors' interest in attempting to upgrade standards coincides
with the public interest; however, the public has an equal interest in
affording qualified brokers and licensees access to the opportunities
inherent in such a significantly competitive vehicle as an MLS.
The influence and voice of Realtors will gain greater respect
among brokers and the public, not by compelling all qualified licensees to become Realtors, but rather by attempting to develop programs and leadership that attract supporters and by promoting, not
restricting, the widest possible access to the MLS. To the extent that
any alleged evils alluded to herein may exist, it is preferable that
they be addressed by the legislature, an appropriate regulatory body,
and/or the courts since these less restrictive alternatives are less likely to be influenced by the narrower concerns of the industry when
they diverge from the interest of the public at large. It would be
regrettable if all qualified real estate licensees were forced to participate in one private trade association. If membership in a Realtor
board merits broker participation, they will participate; if it does not,
brokers should have the option of seeking to satisfy their professional
interests elsewhere. There is no reason why Realtors, any more than
any other trade association, should be assured permanency and a substantial annual income through enforced membership.
2I9

Grillo, 91 N.J. Super. at 222-23, 219 A.2d at 647.

